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THE STATE ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
ACT OF 1971 AND ITS 1973 AMENDMENTS
Charles B. Roe, Jr.* and Charles W. Lean**
The environmental movement burst upon the Washington State
Legislature during 1970 and 1971, producing swift legislative action.1
Within a 16-month period encompassing one regular and two extraor-
dinary sessions the Legislature enacted 14 bills involving environ-
mental protection and natural resource regulation. 2 Although the end
result is impressive, it was not achieved without controversy. Most of
* Member, Washington State Bar Ass'n; Senior Assistant Attorney General, Chief
Counsel, Department of Ecology, State of Washington; Lecturer in Law, Gonzaga
University School of Law; B.A., University of Puget Sound, 1953; J.D., University
of Washington, 1960.
** Member, Washington State Bar Ass'n; Assistant Attorney General, Counsel,
Department of Ecology, State of Washington; B.A., 1965, J.D., 1968, University of
Washington.
This article would not have been written without encouragement of State Represen-
tatives John B. Rabel and G.K. "Jeff' Douthwaite, two of the most effective legislators
in obtaining passage of sound environmental protection legislation. The authors are
also indebted to Attorney General Slade Gorton and Deputy Attorney General
Phillip H. Austin for their support.
I. On January 12, 1970, the Governor of Washington called the Legislature into
extraordinary session, the first held during an even-numbered year since 1950, for the
primary purpose of bringing to the attention of the Legislature a package of seven
environmental protection bills recommended for passage by the Governor. See Message
of Governor Daniel J. Evans convening the extraordinary session of 1970, WASH. S.
JOUR. 9 (1970). By the end of the session, 32 days later, six-sevenths of the Governor's
package of "executive request" bills was enacted. Only a bill relating to shoreline
protection, S.S.B. 18, failed; it died in the Senate in the closing moments of the
session. See Discussion of S.S.B. 18, WASH. S. JOUR. 9 (1970).
The Washington Legislature began its 43d regular session on January 1, 1971. By
the end of the extraordinary session which followed immediately thereafter, the
Legislature had enacted eight more pieces of significant legislation. See note 2 infra.
2. The Environmental Quality Reorganization Act of 1970, WASH. REV. CODE
chs. 43.21A & 43.21B (Supp. 1972). This Act created the Department of Ecology
and the Pollution Control Hearings Board. Surface Mining Control Act, id. ch. 78.44
(Supp. 1972). Amendments to the water pollution laws, id. ch. 90.48 (Supp. 1972).
Thermal Power Plant Siting Act, id. ch. 80.50 (Supp. 1972). Open Space, Agricultural
and Timber Lands Taxation, id. ch. 84.34 (Supp. 1972). State Recreation Trails
System Act, id. ch. 67.32 (Supp. 1972). Shoreline Management Act, id. ch. 90.58
(Supp. 1972). Amendments to the air pollution control laws, id. ch. 70.94 (Supp.
1972). Water Resources Act of 1971, id. ch. 90.54 (Supp. 1972). Model Litter Control
Act, id. ch. 70.94 (Supp. 1972). State Land Planning Commission Act, id. ch. 43.120
(Supp. 1972). The Commission dissolved upon termination of the 43d regular session
of the Legislature in 1973. Coastal Waters Protection Act of 1971, id. ch. 90.48
(Supp. 1972). Washington Water Well Construction Act of 1971, id. ch. 18.104
(Supp. 1972). Pollution Disclosure Act of 1971, id. ch. 90.52 (Supp. 1972).
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the environmental proposals were highly visible, heatedly debated, and
subjected to numerous hostile pressures as they made their tortuous
legislative journeys.
An exception was S.B. 545, which became the State Environmental
Policy Act of 1971 (SEPA).3 Closely paralleling the National Envi-
ronment Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA),4 SEPA contains strong state-
ments of environmental policy 5 and strict procedural mandates applic-
able to all branches of state and local government. 6 It is perhaps the
most significant piece of environmental legislation enacted in Wash-
ington in recent times, 7 yet it passed both houses of the Legislature
with little opposition or discussion and was signed by the Governor8
without public comment.
SEPA's unobtrusive enactment was an inaccurate prognosis of the
legal turbulence it has created.( As of this writing, Washington appel-
late courts have rendered five decisions construing SEPA,10 and sev-
eral more cases are either before the superior courts or in the process
of appeal.1 1 SEPA was amended by the Legislature in 197312 and has
3. Id. ch. 43.2 IC (Supp. 1972).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq. (1970). as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (Supp. 11, 1972).
5. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 43.2 IC.010-.020.
6. Id. § 43.2 IC.030-.040.
7. Seventeen states have adopted some form of SEPA-like policy by statute or
executive order. See Yost, NEPA's Progeny: State Environmental Policy Acts, 3
ENVIRON. L. REP. 50,090 (1973).
8. SEPA was signed by Governor Evans on May 19. 1971, and became effective
90 days thereafter.
9. The smoothness of passage of SEPA through the legislative process is explainable
in terms of political power. Governor Evans requested a SEPA-like bill. H.B. 752. A
similar bill, S.B. 545, was sponsored by Senator Martin J. Durkan. a powerful senator
generally acknowledged at the time as the probable nominee of the Democratic
Party in the race for governor in 1972, and Senators Lowell and Ted Peterson.
Arrangements were made between the Governor and Senator Durkan whereby
S.B. 545 was to be considered for final passage as SEPA. WASH. H.R. JOUR. 1710(1971).
Enactment of S.B. 545 during 1971 was the primary objective of the Washington
Environmental Council, a conservationist organization which lobbied unceasingly for
the Bill's passage. Conversations with Thomas D. Wimmer and Joan Thomas. former
President and President, respectively, of the Washington Environmental Council,
Oct. 8. 1973.
10. Loveless v. Yantis, 82 Wn. 2d 754, 513 P.2d 1023 (1973); Eastlake Com-
munity Council v. Roanoke Associates, 82 Wn. 2d 475, 513 P.2d 36, modified and
petition for rehearing denied, 82 Wn. 2d _ P.2d __ (1973); Stempel v.
Dep't of Water Resources, 82 Wn. 2d 109, 508 P.2d 166 (1973); Juanita Bay Valley
Community Ass'n v. Kirkland, 9 Wn. App. 59, 510 P.2d 1140 (1973); Merkel v. Port
of Brownsville, 8 Wn. App. 844, 509 P.2d 390 (1973). See also State v. Burch, 7 Wn.
App. 657, 501 P.2d 1239(1972).
II. Among the cases involving SEPA pending in the state's appellate courts are
Malmo v. County of Spokane, appeal docketed, No. 42,933, Wash. S. Ct., Aug. 3 1.
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generated a spate of ordinances, 13 regulations, 14 guidelines 15 and spe-
cial studies by various governmental agencies. 16
The intent of this article is to provide an overview of SEPA for the
general practitioner. 17 It will discuss generally the Act itself and the
rapidly developing federal and state case law, and more specifically
the 1973 amendments to SEPA. The article will then suggest both
SEPA's shortcomings and possibilities for its improvement.
I. OUTLINE OF THE STATE ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
ACT OF 1971
A. Introduction
SEPA is divided into two basic parts. The first part, R.C.W. §§
43.21C.010 and .020, contains statements of purpose and policy. The
second part, R.C.W. § 43.21C.030, contains the "action-forcing"
procedural mandates, including the environmental impact statement
requirement.' 8 The language of these two parts of SEPA is largely
1973; Narrowsview Preservation Ass'n v. City of Tacoma, appeal docketed, No. 1113-11,
Wash. Ct. of Appeals, May 25, 1973.
12. Ch. 179, [1973] Wash. Laws 1st Ex. Sess. A discussion thereof is contained
in Section III infra.
13. King County adopted an ordinance implementing SEPA on June 20, 1973.
Copies of a "model" mini-SEPA ordinance, prepared by the Washington State Asso-
ciation of Counties, have been distributed to the various counties. Conversation with
Jack Rogers, ExecutiveSecretary, WashingtonStateAssociation ofCounties,Nov. 5, 1973.
14. WASH. AD. CODE ch. 173-34 (1973). This chapter was adopted by the Depart-
ment of Ecology to implement the single family dwelling exemption authority granted
to that Department in ch. 179, [1973] Wash. Laws Ist Ex. Sess. See also City of
Seattle Policy Statement No. 73-400, Environmental Policy, Oct. 1, 1973; City of
Seattle Standard Operating Procedure No. 100-004, Protection of the Environment,
Oct. 1, 1973.
15. In December, 1972, the Department of Ecology distributed Guidelines to other
public bodies to assist in the implementation of SEPA. These Guidelines were an
update of those distributed in February, 1972. Because SEPA gave no statutory
authority to the Department to issue guidelines, they do not have the force of regulations.
16. Pursuant to a contract with the Washington Office of Program Planning and
Fiscal Management, the Washington Planning and Community Affairs Agency and
the Department of Ecology, a consulting firm prepared a study of SEPA, including
recommendations for its implementation. See Haworth & Anderson, SEPA Study,
Dec., 1973. The City of Seattle convened an "Environmental Task Force" in 1973
to recommend methods to implement SEPA.
17. For a feature length discussion of NEPA issues, see Coggins, Preparing an
Environmental Law Suit, Part 1, 58 IowA L. REV. 277 (1973), and Part 2 of the same
article, id., at 487. See also F. ANDERSON, NEPA IN THE COURTS (1973) [hereinafter
cited as F. ANDERSON].
18. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C.030 also includes substantive aspects, as discussed
in Section 1I-C infra.
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"taken verbatim" from that of NEPA. 19 Because of this similarity, the
Washington courts will "look when necessary to the federal cases con-
struing and applying provisions of NEPA for guidance"; 20 the federal
cases thus provide authority in the many areas where the Washington
court has not yet spoken.
B. SEPA 's "Action-Forcing" Provisions
1. The Statutory Framework
The major procedural requirements of SEPA are contained in
R.C.W. § 43.21C.030, which reads in pertinent part as follows:
(2) All branches of government of this state, including state agencies,
municipal and public corporations, and counties shall:
(c) Include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legis-
lation and other major actions significantly affecting the quality of the
environment, a detailed statement by the responsible official on:
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action;
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided
should the proposal be implemented;
(iii) alternatives to the proposed actions;
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environ-
ment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term produc-
tivity; and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources
19. Eastlake, 82 Wn. 2d at '488 n.5, 513 P.2d at 45. There are several notable
differences between NEPA and SEPA, as noted in the Brief for the Washington State
Attorney General as Amicus Curiae, Juanita Bay Valley Community Ass'n v. Kirkland.
9 Wn. App. 59, 510 P.2d 390 (1973).
(1) In SEPA, WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C.020(3) reads in part as follows: "'The
legislature recognizes that each person has a fundamental and inalienable right to a
healthful environment .... ." This was the language of NEPA as passed by the
Senate. As altered in conference and finally adopted, it read as follows: "The Congress
recognizes that each person should enjoy a healthful environment. 42 U.S.C.
§ 433 I(c).
(2) NEPA applies only to the federal government, whereas SEPA applies to state
government, all municipal and public corporations, and counties in Washington.
(3) There is no agency in Washington state corresponding to the federal Council
on Environmental Quality established under Title II ofNEPA.
See generally Juanita Bay, 9 Wn. App. at 68-69 n.5, 510 P.2d at 1146-47.
20. Eastlake, 82Wn. 2d at 488 n.5, 513 P.2d at 45.
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which would be involved in the proposed action should it be imple-
mented;...
(d) Prior to making any detailed statement, the responsible official
shall consult with and obtain the comments of any public agency
which has jurisdiction by law or special expertise with respect to any
environmental impact involved. Copies of such statement and the
comments and views of the appropriate federal, province, state, and
local agencies, which are authorized to develop and enforce environ-
mental standards, shall be made available to the governor, the depart-
ment of ecology, the ecological commission, and the public, and shall
accompany the proposal through the existing agency review processes.
... (emphasis added)
The importance of these procedural mandates cannot be overemphas-
ized. They form the basis for most of the litigation involving SEPA
and NEPA, and courts have required strict compliance by govern-
mental agencies "to the fullest extent possible. 21
The central procedural requirement of SEPA is the directive to the
responsible governmental agency to prepare a "detailed statement" on
environmental matters (usually called an environmental impact state-
ment) prior to the agency's action on all "proposals for legislation and
other major actions significantly affecting the quality of the environ-
ment. ' 22 Prior to making the final statement, the responsible govern-.
mental agency is reqifed to consult with other agencies having jurisdic-
tion by law or special expertise with respect to any environmental
impact involved.23 This consultation is normally accomplished by
preparing a draft impact statement which discusses those topics set
forth in R.C.W.§ 43.21C.030(2)(c); this draft statement is then circu-
lated to the other agencies and the public. A final impact statement,
reflecting the input from the other agencies and the public, as well as
any further updating of the proposal, is then prepared.24 The final
21. Id. at 490, 513 P.2d at 46. Similar language is typical of federal court opinions.
See, e.g., Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1114 (D.C.
Cir. 1971), where the court ruled that NEPA's "'fullest extent possible mandate'
sets a high standard for the agencies .... "
22. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C.030(2)(c).
23. Id. § 43.2 IC.030(2)(d).
24. Although it is apparently a uniform federal practice to "consult" with other
agencies through circulation of draft impact statements, draft impact statements are
not mentioned in either NEPA or SEPA. It is possible that more efficient and effective
procedures for consulting with other agencies could be developed which would elim-
inate the draft impact statement.
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impact statement, together with comments of other agencies, must be
filed with the Governor, the Department of Ecology, and the Ecolog-
ical Commission, and must be made available to the public prior to
the governmental action. The final statement must accompany the
proposal through the governmental agency's decision-making process. 25
2. Governmental Actions Which Require an Impact Statement
Impact statements must precede governmental decisions on "major
actions significantly affecting the quality of the environment. '26 To
ascertain which governmental actions fall within this requirement, the
Washington Supreme Court in Eastlake Community Council v.
Roanoke Associates, Inc.27 used a bifurcated test to analyze first the
nature of the "action" and, then separately, the "significance" of the
effect.
A major action, according to the Eastlake court, is one which in-
volves a "discretionary nonduplicative stage" 28 of governmental ap-
proval. The court refined this definition in Loveless v. Yantis29 by
stating that, "[w] here choice exists there is discretion .. ".."30 By re-
quiring consideration of environmental factors, SEPA itself may have
introduced an element of discretion into decisions which formerly
were considered ministerial. Employing this analysis, the Washington
Court of Appeals in Juanita Bay Valley Community Association v.
City of Kirkland3' held that while the issuance of a grading permit
may have been a ministerial, nondiscretionary act prior to SEPA,
"SEPA makes it legislative and discretionary. '32
25. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C.030(2)(d).
26. Id. § 43.21C.030(2) (c).
27. 82 Wn. 2d 475, 489-93, 513 P.2d 36, 46-47, modified and petition for rehearing
denied, 82 Wn. 2d .... P.2d - (1973).
28. Id. at 490, 513 P.2d at 46.
29. 82Wn. 2d754,513 P.2d 1023(1973).
30. Id. at 764, 513 P.2d at 1029. The full statement is:
Where choice exists there is discretion and the fact that previous to SEPA the
choice could be solely based on narrow or limited evaluative points set forth in
an ordinance or statute is immaterial.
Accord, Eastlake, 82 Wn. 2d at 492, 513 P.2d at 46.
31. 9Wn. App. 59,510P.2d 1140(1973).
32. Id. at 73, 510 P.2d at 1149.
One of the parties argued to the court that SEPA applied only to "'legislative" and
not "ministerial" actions of local governments. The court, unfortunately, utilized the
legislative/ministerial phraseology in its opinion.
SEPA, however, does not change the permit issuing functions of local government
514
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Projects undertaken directly by governmental agencies are poten-
tially major actions which require impact statements when they signif-
icantly affect the quality of the environment. 33 Likewise, government
grants or loans, 34 the sale or lease of government property,35 pro-
posals for legislation and even requests for appropriations by govern-
mental agencies may also fall within the ambit of a major action. 36
While it has been clear since the inception of NEPA and SEPA that
projects undertaken directly by governmental agencies can constitute
major actions, it was unclear initially whether NEPA and SEPA ap-
plied to governmental approval of private projects. However, judicial
decisions have established that governmental approval of private proj-
ects by granting permits or, certifications can also constitute major
from "law applying" to "law making" functions. Rather, SEPA provides additional
law to apply. The policies and goals of SEPA supplement the other legislative direc-
tives which the governmental body is acting under. To speak of this as making the
function "legislative" is misleading.
33. See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers, 470 F.2d 289
(8th Cir. 1972), involving a dam project; Lee v. Resor, 348 F. Supp. 389 (M.D. Fla.
1972), involving the spraying of hyacinths in navigable waters with herbicides; Envir-
onmental Defense Fund v. Hardin, 325 F. Supp. 1401 (D.D.C. 1971), involving the
pesticide spraying of fire ants; Sierra Club v. Mason, 351 F. Supp. 419 (D. Conn.
1972), pertaining to a dredging activity designed to maintain a long established harbor.
34. See, e.g., Lathan v. Volpe, 455 F.2d 1111 (9th Cir. 1971); Goose Hollow
Foothills League v. Romney, 334 F. Supp. 877 (D. Ore. 1971).
35. See, e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827 (D.C.
Cir. 1972) (oil and gas leases of submerged lands); Davis v. Morton, 469 F.2d 593
(10th Cir. 1972) (lease of Indian lands to a private developer); and Minnesota Public
Interest Research Group v. Butz, 358 F. Supp. 584 (D. Minn. 1973) (timber sales
and logging within National Forest). Likewise, a decision by a federal agency not to
continue the purchase of a natural resource is potentially a major action. National
Helium Corp. v. Morton, 455 F.2d 650 (10th Cir. 197 1).
36. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C.030(2)(c) directs all branches of government to
include an environmental impact statement "in every recommendation or report on
proposals for legislation and other major actions significantly affecting the quality of
the environment.... (emphasis added)
Because of the separation of powers doctrine, it is unlikely that the courts would
attempt enforcement of this provision in such a manner as to interfere with the
internal workings of the state legislature. The provision would seem enforceable with
respect to local ordinances and regulations of state and local agencies. See Roswell v.
New Mexico Water Quality Control Comm'n, 84 N.M. 561, 505 P.2d 1237 (N.M.
Ct. App. 1972), cert. denied, 84 N.M. 560, 505 P.2d 1236 (N.M. 1973).
The provision would also seem applicable to agency requests for legislation, or for
appropriations. See Council on Environmental Quality, Statements on Proposed
Federal Actions Affecting the Environment, Guidelines § 1500.5(a) (1), 39 Fed.
Reg. 20,550, 20,551 (1973) [hereinafter cited as CEQ Guidelines ], where "actions"
for the purposes of NEPA are defined to include: "[r] ecommendations or favorable
reports relating to legislation including that for appropriations." Federal agencies are
required to submit legislative proposals to the Office of Management and Budget.
That office requires impact statements for some proposals; however, its requirements
are less than comprehensive. See F. ANDERSON, supra note 17, at 131-33.
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actions.37 Washington appellate courts have indicated that the follow-
ing governmental actions may constitute major actions under SEPA:
issuance of water rights permits, 38 grading permits, 39 building per-
mits, 40 shorelines permits41 and approval of preliminary plats. 42
Because virtually every governmental action is potentially a major
action, it is the second prong of the Eastlake court's analysis, a deter-
mination of whether the action will "significantly affect the quality of
the environment," which usually determines whether an action is sub-
ject to the impact statement requirement.43 The Washington courts,
however, have not yet construed the meaning of this clause. The
Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) Guidelines to NEPA 44 sug-
gest that concerned governmental agencies look to the potential deg-
radation of the quality of the environment, curtailment of the range of
beneficial uses, the serving of short-term rather than long-term envi-
ronmental goals and the secondary or indirect consequences of gov-
ernmental action as indicia that a proposal may significantly affect the
quality of the environment. The Washington State Department of
Ecology's Guidelines for SEPA offer similar suggestions. While nei-
ther the SEPA guidelines nor the NEPA guidelines are binding regu-
lations for governmental agencies in Washington, both may be ac-
corded weight by Washington courts.
The environmental significance of a proposal has not been a major
issue thus far in any of the Washington cases. The court, however, has
required the preparation of an environmental impact statement in two
cases, thus by necessary implication determining that the projects in
37. See, e.g., Eastlake.
38. Stempel v. Dep't of Water Resources, 82 Wn. 2d 109, 508 P.2d 166 (1973).
39. Juanita Bay.
40. Eastlake.
41. Cf., Merkel v. Port of Brownsville, 8 Wn. App. 844, 509 P.2d 390 (1973).
Although the court did not hold that a shoreline permit required an impact statement
(a statement having been previously required by the trial court), it was held that the
relationship between the Shoreline Management Act of 1971. WASH. REv. CODE ch.
90.58 (Supp. 1972), and SEPA was such that the upland portion of a project could
not be begun until a shoreline permit was issued for the waterfront portion of the
same project.
42. Loveless.
43. In Eastlake, 82 Wn. 2d at 490, 513 P.2d at 46, the court stated:
[G] overnmental action may be separated from the actual project, yet the action
may be deemed "major". When such separation exists, as here, the character of
the project must be considered in detet mining whether the government action is
to be deemed "major".
44. 38 Fed. Reg. 20,550 (1973).
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those cases significantly affected the environment. In Eastlake an
impact statement was required for renewal of a building permit for a
five-story condominium project extending into Lake Union in Seattle;
and in Loveless a statement was required prior to a preliminary plat
approval for a project consisting of multifamily condominiums.
In Merkel v. Port of Brownsville45 the trial court required an im-
pact-statement for a marina expansion project encompassing 12 acres
of shorelands and 10 acres of adjacent uplands. This holding was not
disputed on appeal. In Juanita Bay the Washington Court of Appeals
remanded a grading permit back to the city for a threshold investiga-
tion of whether an impact statement was required. The project in that
case involved grading a portion of a 55-acre tract of land, possibly as
the first step in the construction of an industrial park. Similarly, the
court in Stempel v. Department of Water Resources46 remanded a
water right permit which would have permitted withdrawal of water
from Loon Lake in Stevens County for 143 lots.
3. The "Threshold" Determination of Environmental Significance
Assuming a governmental agency is considering an action which
may have environmental effects and for which an impact statement
may be required, the obvious first step for the agency is to determine
whether to prepare a statement. In making this threshold determina-
tion, the governmental agency must actually consider the various envi-
ronmental factors even if it concludes that the action does not signifi-
cantly affect the environment and, therefore, does not require a state-
ment.47 Failure by a governmental agency to predicate its decision not
to prepare a statement upon an adequate threshold investigation of
environmental concerns may result in a judicial remand to the agency.48
The threshold investigation should consider the cumulative envi-
ronmental impacts of the total project.49 This investigation is often
45. 8 Wn. App. 844, 509 P.2d 390 (1973).
46. 82Wn. 2d 109, 508 P.2d 166(1973).
47. See Arizona Pub. Serv. Co. v. FPC, 483 F.2d 1275 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Hanly
v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 829 (2d Cir. 1972); Juanita Bay.
48. Failure of the agency to so demonstrate justifies a "remand [of the] case to
the [agency] for its determination of whether it is necessary to prepare an Environ-
mental Impact Statement." Juanita Bay, 9 Wn. App. at 73, 510 P.2d at 1149.
49. See, e.g., Eastlake, 82 Wn. 2d at 492, 513 P.2d at 47, where the court noted:
517
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based on an environmental "assessment" supplied by the developer. 50
If this threshold investigation reveals one or more areas of potentially
significant impact, a full environmental impact statement should be
prepared. 51
If, after the threshold investigation, a governmental agency deter-
mines an impact statement is not required, it frequently prepares a
document called a "negative declaration," summarizing the investiga-
tions and conclusions leading to the determination not to prepare a
full statement. 52 An agency may choose to circulate and file a negative
declaration similar to the way it files and circulates a draft impact
statement. 53 However, the practice of preparing and circulating a neg-
ative declaration in this manner was developed by federal agencies
and is not required by the express language of NEPA or SEPA. No
particular form or document is required to evidence a negative
threshold determination. 54 The governmental agency need only show
"It is unquestionable that numerous, modest and common governmental actions may
be as damaging to the environment as a single, vigorous and critical action." See also
Juanita Bay, 9 Wn. App. at 72. 510 P.2d at 1149.
50. See note 66 infra.
51. The CEQ Guidelines provide that "if there is potential that the environment
may be significantly affected, the impact statement is to be prepared." CEQ Guide-
lines § 1500.6(a), 38 Fed. Reg. at 20, 551.
The courts have taken varying approaches to this subject, the differences being
about the degree of likelihood that significant impacts will occur. In Save Our Ten
Acres v. Kreger, 472 F.2d 463, 467 (5th Cir. 1973), the court ruled that an impact
statement is required if "the project may cause a significant degradation of some hu-
man environmental factor." In Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures
v. United States, 346 F. Supp. 189, 201, rev'd on other grounds, 409 U.S. 1073 (1973).
an impact statement was required "whenever the action arguably will have an adverse
environmental impact." (Emphasis in original; the court noting in a footnote that the
test might be different for an agency determination supported by a more complete
administrative record.) In Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 829 (2d Cir. 1972). both
the majority and dissenting opinions contain extensive discussions of this issue.
52. See, e.g., Environmental Protection Agency, Preparation of Environmental
Impact Statement-Interim Regulation, 38 Fed. Reg. 1697 (1973); Washington
State Department of Ecology, Guidelines for Implementation of the State Environ-
mental Policy Act of 1971, at 8, Dec., 1972.
The negative declaration is termed a "declaration of no significant impact" by some
local agencies in Washington State. See, e.g., KING COUNTY. WASH., CODE § 20.44.020
(d) (1973).
53. The Washington State Department of Ecology, which receives impact state-
ments filed under SEPA, also receives many negative declarations.
54. First National Bank of Homestead v. Watson, 363 F. Supp. 466 (D.D.C.
1973). Some cases have held that an agency making a threshold determination is
required to "affirmatively develop a reviewable environmental record." Hanly v.
Mitchell, 460 F.2d 640, 647 (2d Cir. 1972). See also, First National Bank of Chi-
cago v. Richardson, 484 F.2d 1369 (7th Cir. 1973); Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d
829 (2d Cir. 1972). Others hold that no written record is necessary, although such
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"that environmental factors were considered in a manner sufficient to
amount to prima facie compliance with the procedural requirements
of SEPA. ' '55
4. Timing of the Final Impact Statement
If a project which significantly affects the environment involves just
one major governmental action, e.g., issuing a building permit, the
final statement clearly must be available prior to the time that one ac-
tion is taken. However, when a project involves more than one major
action, e.g., a rezone followed by issuing a building permit, the ques-
tion often arises as to when the final statement must be available. The
Washington decisions make it clear that the final impact statement
must precede the first major action by government authorizing the
project 56-even if the environmental impact of that first action is
"modest"-if cumulatively all actions relating to the project signifi-
cantly affect the quality of the environment.57 It is no defense to state
a record would facilitate review. Scherr v. Volpe, 466 F.2d 1027 (7th Cir. 1972).
In Washington, review of administrative decisions is not confined to the record,
except in review of contested cases under WASH. REV. CODE ch. 34.04 (1963), as
amended, id. §§ 34.04.025, .140, .150 (Supp. 1972). Although written documentation
of the threshold review may be desirable, there is no statutory requirement for such
documentation. The only Washington case considering threshold determinations,
Juanita Bay, makes no mention of documentation.
If no written record exists, courts should allow government officials to be ex-
amined concerning their threshold review, including, where appropriate, their mental
processes in reaching the threshold determination. See Citizens to Preserve Overton
Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (197 1).
55. Juanita Bay, 9 Wn. App. at 73, 510 P.2d at 1149.
56. In Juanita Bay, id. at 72-73, 510 P.2d at 1149, the court stated:
We therefore conclude SEPA requires that an Environmental Impact Statement
be prepared prior to the first government authorization of any part of a project
or series of projects which, when considered cumulatively, constitute a major
action "significantly affecting the quality of the environment.
57. See note 49 supra. In Natural Resources Defense Council v. Morton, 458
F.2d 827, 836 (D.C. Cir. 1972), the court reviewed the effect of NEPA:
What NEPA infused into the decision-making process in 1969 was a directive
as to environmental impact statements that was meant to implement the Congres-
sional objectives of Government coordination, a comprehensive approach to
environmental management, and a determination to face problems of pollution
"while they are still of manageable proportions and while alternative solutions
are still available" rather than persist in environmental decision-making wherein
"policy is established by default and inaction" and environmental decisions
"continue to be made in small but steady increments" that perpetuate the
mistakes of the past without being dealt with until "they reach crisis proportions."
S. Rep. No. 91-296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969) p. 5.
See also, Greene County Planning Bd. v. FPC, 455 F.2d 412, 424 (2d Cir. 1972).
In Citizens for Clean Air v. Corps of Engineers,-349 F. Supp. 696 (S.D. N.Y. 1972),
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that all impacts cannot be identified at the time of the first major ac-
tion; those which can be identified should be studied and an impact
statement should be prepared. Applying this rule in Loveless, the
Washington court required that an impact statement be prepared
prior to preliminary approval of a plat for a condominium project.
However, a new impact statement is not necessarily required for each
agency action; if environmental issues previously have been consi-
dered concurrently with earlier approvals and an impact statement
has been prepared, then a new or revised statement is required only
if new information or developments have intervened. 58
This rule requiring early preparation of impact statements59 is sup-
ported by the practical consideration that early approvals of even
seemingly insignificant portions of a project may commit govern-
mental decision-makers to a particular course of action upon the
project as a whole. If preparation of the impact statement is delayed,
consideration of environmental factors will become subordinated to
the momentum of the project.60 Also, early application of SEPA will
minimize investment costs if environmental considerations lead to a
decision to abandon or alter the project.61
a proposed power plant needed two permits from the Corps of Engineers. The Corps
originally planned to prepare an environmental impact statement prior to the issuance
of either permit; then, apparently because of time pressure, went ahead and issued
one permit without an impact statement. The court rejected this approach, stating:
The decision to issue the permit without an environmental impact review runs
counter to the fundamental requirements of NEPA. The central purpose of the
Act is defeated if agencies carve "federal actions" into exempted fragments. § 102
[comparable to RCW 43.21C.030] "is a mandate to consider environmental
values 'at every distinctive and comprehensive state of the [agency's] process.'"
[citing Greene County, 455 F.2d at 420]
349 F. Supp. at 707.
58. 82 Wn. 2d at 764-65, 513 P.2d at 1029.
59. See Scientists' Institute for Pub. Information v. AEC, 481 F.2d 1079 (D.C.
Cir. 1973), where the Atomic Energy Commission was required to prepare an impact
statement for the liquid metal fast breeder reactor research and development program.
Although the program in question is a research program, it is estimated to require
future expenditures of over $2 billion, and is planned to lead to the point of large-
scale commercial utilization. The court held that "NEPA requires impact statements
for major federal research programs ...aimed at development of new technologies
which, when applied, will significantly affect the quality of the human environment."
Id. at 109 1.
60. In Loveless, the Washington court justified early analysis as a means of
avoiding "crisis decision making" and "catastrophic environmental damage." 82 Wn.
2d at 765, 513 P.2d at 1030. The court recognized that "the threat today to the
environment is not its sudden destruction but its progressive degradation." Id. at
766. 513 P.2d at 1030.
61. Id. at 765, 513 P.2d at 1030.
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5. Preparation of Impact Statements-Is Nongovernmental
Input Allowed?
R.C.W.§ 43.21C.030 requires in appropriate situations "a detailed
statement by the responsible official" on the environmental impact of
the proposed action; this provision seemingly places the onus for pre-
paring impact statements upon governmental entities. Washington
courts have not yet decided whether an impact statement may be pre-
pared by a nongovernmental entity.
Some federal decisions hold that federal agencies may not adopt
statements prepared by state agencies; 62 others hold that a federal
agency may adopt a statement prepared by a state agency 63 or even by
a private consultant with a financial interest in the project if the
agency participated in all important stages of the project analysis.64
Factors considered by the federal courts in ruling on this delegation
problem include the probability of the preparer's bias, traditions of
administrative practice and the ability of the responsible official to
make an informed decision.65
62. In Greene County Planning Bd. v. FPC, 455 F.2d 412 (2d Cir. 1972), it was
held that the FPC could not adopt an impact statement prepared by a state power
authority, but rather the Commission staff must prepare its own impact statement.
The court stated:
The Federal Power Commission has abdicated a significant part of its responsi-
bility by substituting the statement of PASNY for its own. The Commission
appears to be content to collate the comments of other federal agencies, its own
staff and the intervenors and once again to act as an umpire. The danger of this
procedure, and one obvious, shortcoming, is the potential, if not likelihood, that
the applicant's statement will be based upon self-serving assumptions.
Id. at 420 (footnotes omitted). Adoption of a state-proposed impact statement by
the Federal Highway Administration was held improper in Conservation Soc'y of
Southern Vt. v. Sec'y of Transportation, 362 F. Supp. 627 (D. Vt. 1973).
63. See, e.g., Finish Allatoona's Interstate Right v. Volpe, 355 F. Supp. 933(N.D. Ga. 1973) (holding contrary to Conservation Soc'y, supra note 62, in analogous
situation); accord, Citizens v. Brinegar, 357 F. Supp. 1269 (D. Ariz. 1973).
64. In Life of the Land v. Brinegar, 485 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1973), the court
approved an impact statement for an airport runway which was primarily prepared
by a private consultant (apparently hired by the state) and adopted by the Federal
Aviation Agency. The consultant was also retained to work on the engineering, design
and construction of the project, and thus had a financial interest in securing FAA
approval. FAA and state officials were involved in the preparation of the statement
from its early stages onward-at least to the extent that they had regular meetings
with the consultant. From its review of the facts the court concluded:
While Parsons [the consultant] may have assisted in the EIS preparation, the
significant and active participation by the FAA therein precludes us from con-
cluding that there was any improper or illegal delegation in this case.-
Id. at 468 (footnote omitted).
65. National Forest Preservation Group v. Volpe, 352 F. Supp. 123 (D. Mont.
1972), and Iowa Citizens for Environmental Quality v. Volpe, 4 BNA ENVIRON. REP.
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Many agencies of state and particularly of local government in
Washington do not have the capability to prepare adequate impact
statements. Therefore, in a licensing proceeding they often rely upon
the applicant (or upon consultants hired either by the applicant or the
agency) to provide information in the form of an "environmental as-
sessment." 66 The information in the assessment then provides the basis
for an impact statement or negative declaration. There is danger in
this approach. To the extent that information supplied by the appli-
cant is accepted uncritically by the governmental agency and utilized
as an impact statement or as the sole basis for a negative threshold
determination, courts could hold that the agency had "abdicated a
1755 (S.D. Iowa 1972). in upholding impact statements prepared by state highway
departments, emphasize the close cooperation established by statute between state and
federal governments dealing with interstate highways, the administrative interpretations
of the Department of Transportation, and a supposed low probability of bias in state
prepared impact statements.
In Pizitz v. Volpe, 2 ENVIRON. L. REP. 20,379 (5th Cir. 1972), the court had
originally stated, id. at 20,379 (footnote omitted):
We find no merit in the contentions of appellants that the responsible federal
officials could not, under the applicable federal statutes accept an environmental
impact statement prepared by a state highway department.
The court cited the administrative practice of the Department of Transportation and
the Federal Highway Administration in support of this statement, such administrative
interpretations being entitled to "great weight" in the courts. On petition for rehearing.
the above statement was stricken, as "it was not necessary to reach [the] issue." The
court indicated that it would "leave that question for decision in a case in which it is
essential to the decision," id. at 20,635. The opinion, as modified, is reported at 467
F.2d 208.
66. In federal practice, the environmental assessments are often prepared in the
same format as impact statements, which has lead to the temptation to adopt the
assessment as a statement. For instance, the Environmental Protection Agency requires
that environmental assessments be submitted by most applicants for construction
grants administered by that agency. See Environmental Protection Agency, Interim
Regulations, Preparation of Environmental Impact Statements, 38 Fed. Reg. 1708
(1973). The term, "environmental assessment," may also be used to identify a docu-
ment prepared by an agency as part of its threshold determination of whether to
prepare a statement. See, e.g., Dep't of the Army, Office of the Chief of Engineers.
Reg. No. ER 1105-2-507, Preparation and Coordination of Environmental Statements
§ F.e.(1)(a) (1973).
WASH. REv. CODE § 43.2 IC.030(2)(b) requires all branches of government of this
state to:
Identify and develop methods and procedures, in consultation with the department
of ecology and the ecological commission, which will insure that presently
unquantified environmental amenities and values will be given appropriate con-
sideration in decision making along with economic and technical considerations.
This legislative mandate should provide adequate authority for requiring applicants to
submit environmental data with all applications for authorizations which may have
an impact on the environment. Some state and local agencies now require applicants
for permits or approvals to submit an environmental assessment of the proposal.
See, e.g., KING COUNTY, WASH., CODE ch. 20.44 (1973).
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significant part of its responsibility" under SEPA.67 At a minimum,
governmental agencies should exercise significant supervision and re-
view over all stages of the impact statement preparation process. 68
6. Consultation With Other Agencies
R.C.W.§ 43.21C.030(2)(d) provides that prior to making a detailed
statement, the responsible governmental agency shall "consult with
and obtain the comments of any public agency which has jurisdiction
by law or special expertise with respect to any environmental impact
involved. '69 The purpose of this provision is to ensure that a potential
environmental impact of which the sponsoring agency is unaware does
not go undetected until it is too late for remedial action.7 0 Failure to
consult with other agencies prior to making a final statement may re-
sult in judicial remand back to the sponsoring agency.7 1
The most common practice at both state and federal levels has been
to prepare a draft statement for circulation to other agencies. This
statement is then revised to reflect the comments received from other
agencies as well as the public,72 and a final impact statement is issued.
67. Greene County Planning Bd. v. FPC, 455 F.2d 412, 420 (2d Cir. 1972).
68. See Life of the Land v. Brinegar, 485 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1973). For a some-
what more stringent view of an agency's role in impact statement preparation, see
F. ANDERSON, supra note 17, at 195:
Although the trend has not been irrevocably established, the courts will probably
apply the Greene County rationale and require agencies to prepare their own
impact statements at an early stage of agency decision making. Yet the holding
in Greene County does not appear to require the agency to bear all of the addi-
tional expense and conduct all the necessary studies; as long as the agency
consults with appropriate parties and then prepares a detailed statement that
accompanies the proposed action at every distinct stage of agency decision making,
it is free to require state governments and private parties to supply information,
hire consultants, conduct field studies, and seek other assistance in carrying out
its responsibilities. The synthesis and evaluation of such information, however,
must be done by the agency.
69. To aid compliance with this provision, the state Department of Ecology has
provided a "State Agency Contact List." See Washington State Department of Ecology,
Guidelines for Implementation of the State Environmental Policy Act app. 2, Dec.,
1972. The Federal Council on Environmental Quality has provided a similar but more
detailed listing in Appendix II to its CEQ Guidelines, 38 Fed. Reg. at 20,557-62 (1973).
70. Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 359 F. Supp. 1289 (S.D. Tex. 1973).
71. Monroe County Conservation Council v. Volpe, 472 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1972).
In Merkel v. Port of Brownsville, supra note 10, the trial court continued an injunction
against a proposed port development to allow time for review of the impact statement
by other agencies. The case was later appealed to the state court of appeals on
another issue.
72. See Comm. for Nuclear Responsibility v. Seaborg, 463 F.2d 783 (D.C. Cir.
1971); Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers, 348 F. Supp. 916 (N.D.
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Unfortunately, the agencies with primary environmental expertise at
both state and federal levels appear to visualize their roles in this
process as arbiters of the adequacy of the statement rather than as re-
servoirs of substantive information. Comments from these reviewing
agencies frequently contain criticisms of the scope and content of the
statement reviewed, but very seldom provide additional information. 73
At the state level, this approach often results in passing the burden of
compiling scientific information to those units of government least
capable of doing so-local governments. There has been little judicial
discussion of the responsibilities of reviewing agencies, but clearly
there is a need for revision of the present attitudes and practices of
those agencies.74
Miss. 1972); Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers, 325 F. Supp. 741
(E.D. Ark. 1972), aff'd, 470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1972).
73. Comments on impact statements by the federal Environmental Protection
Agency frequently consist of a brief discussion followed by an "evaluation" of the
impact statement. Although these comments frequently point out shortcomings in
coverage, they seldom provide substantive information. Comments prepared by the
Washington State Department of Ecology often follow essentially the same format.
Recently, for some projects, the Department of Ecology has conducted site inspections
and has included detailed substantive information in its comments on impact state-
ments. Conversation with Dennis Lundblad, Department of Ecology, Oct. 12, 1973.
Budgetary and staff limitations limit the effectiveness of agency review. Both the
Environmental Protection Agency and the Department of Ecology, because of their
wide ranging environmental responsibilities, receive numerous impact statements for
review and comment.
The Council on Environmental Quality, in its third annual report to the President,
commented upon the problem as follows:
[T] he Department of the Interior is asked to comment on hundreds of proposed
actions affecting land use and fish and wildlife values. EPA, with its expertise in
pollution control, faces a similar situation ... Private environmental groups, too,
often find their resources taxed by the opportunities for comment on federal actions.
One answer to this problem, obviously, is for the commenting entities to add the
staff and other resources to handle the commenting task. The opportunity to
make Federal decisionmaking better informed and more carefully planned warrants
the necessary manpower.
COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, THIRD ANNUAL REPORT ch. 7, reprinted in 2
ENVIRON. L. REP. 50,025, 50,031 (1972).
74. A federal district court in Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 359 F. Supp. 1289,
1346-47 (S.D. Tex. 1973), had the following comments about the duties of reviewing
agencies:
If in a given situation it reasonably appears that an on-site investigation is
required before a reviewing agency may adequately exercise its expertise, then
an on-site investigation is required. This is likely to arise more frequently with
respect to particularly large projects. Similarly, when an agency's expertise would
indicate that it should have comments upon a given proposal, then comments
should be made. More importantly, the range of its comments should focus upon
the impact the project will have upon the environment, a determination which
may require the reviewing agency's expertise, not just whether the project will
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7. Contents of Environmental Impact Statements
SEPA lists five topics which must be discussed in an environmental
impact statement. R.C.W. § 43.21C.030(2)(c) requires:
[A] detailed statement by the responsible official on:
(i) The environmental impact of the proposed action;
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided
should the proposal be implemented;
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action;
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environ-
ment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term produc-
tivity; and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources
which would be involved in the proposed action should it be imple-
mented;
While Washington cases have not yet considered the adequacy of the
contents of impact statements, the NEPA cases often have interpreted
the meaning of these requirements. Those issues most frequently liti-
gated have involved the sufficiency of the impact statement's discussion
of the environmental impacts of and the alternatives to the proposed
action.
The "range of impacts" required to be discussed includes all pos-
sible significant effects on the environment,75 including beneficial as
well as adverse effects. "Primary attention should be given in the
statement to discussing those factors most evidently impacted by the
affect some other on-going project being conducted by the reviewing agency.
Application of this expertise may require a myriad of activities, such as file checks,
reviews of past studies, literature searches or map investigations. (footnotes
omitted)
75. Sierra Club v. Froehlke, supra note 74. See also Environmental Defense Fund
v. Armstrong, 352 F. Supp. 50 (N.D. Cal. 1972); Environmental Defense Fund v.
Corps of Engineers, 325 F. Supp. 749 (E.D. Ark. 1971). The court in Environmental
Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers, 348 F. Supp. 916, 933 (N.D. Miss. 1972),
defined the coverage in a slightly different manner:
Thus a § 102 statement must thoroughly discuss the significant aspects of the
probable environmental impact of the proposed agency action. By definition, this
excludes the necessity for discussing either insignificant matters, such as those
without import, or remote effects, such as mere possibilities unlikely to occur
as a result of the proposed activity. (emphasis in original)
If the courts apply a "rule of reason" to the required coverage of impact statements
(as many courts do), then the differences between the two tests-possible vs. probable
impact-is not likely to be significant. See Sierra Club v. Froehlke, supra note 74.
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proposed action. ' 76 In addition, secondary or indirect effects should
be analyzed and discussed as appropriate. 77
Failure to identify and evaluate alternatives has been a frequently
litigated issue. A full range of alternatives to the proposed action, in-
cluding abandonment of the proposal, should be listed and evaluated
in the impact statement,7 8 even if some of the alternatives are outside
the control of the agency preparing the statement.79 So long as an al-
ternative is potentially viable, it should be evaluated; a "rule of rea-
son,"8 0 however, precludes the necessity of discussing every conceiv-
able alternative.
The purpose of evaluating alternatives is to explore methods by
which adverse environmental effects may be mitigated and to allow
comparison of the environmental costs presented by alternative
courses of action. The statement should identify the benefits and envir-
onmental costs for each alternative and facilitate a comparison with the
benefits and costs of the proposed action.81 SEPA, however, does not
76. CEQ Guidelines, 38 Fed. Reg. at 20,553.
77. Id. Consideration of secondary effects is not limited to the traditional areas
of administrative jurisdiction or expertise. Rather, all reasonably foreseeable, substantial
impacts must be thoroughly discussed. Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. AEC.
449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
78. See, e.g., Monroe County Conservation Council v. Volpe, 472 F.2d 693
(2d Cir. 1972); Natural Resources Defense Council v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827 (D.C.
Cir. 1972); Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 359 F. Supp. 1289 (S.D. Tex. 1973); Environ-
mental Defense Fund v. Armstrong, 356 F. Supp. 131 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
In Environmental Defense Fund v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d 346, 350 (8th Cir. 1972).
the court stated the requirement as follows:
To fulfill these mandates, the impact statement should not just list the alternatives
to the proposed project but it should also include the result of the Corps' own
investigation and evaluation of alternatives so that the reasons for the choice of a
course of action are clear.
The above statement should be compared with the following from Life of the Land
v. Volpe, 363 F. Supp. 1171, affd sub noma. Life of the Land v. Brinegar, 485 F.2d
460 (9th Cir. 1973), where the court upheld an impact statement and stated. 363
F. Supp. at 1175:
Case law places special emphasis on this NEPA requirement and especially on the
inclusion of abandonment of the project as an alternative. The EIS here is very
sketchy in this area. Yet it does appear from the evidence that the responsible
officials in the decision making process and in the review process did in fact
consider many alternatives, including nonconstruction alternatives.
79. Natural Resources Defense Council v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 834 (D.C.
Cir. 1972). Among the alternatives required to be discussed, however, was the
elimination of oil import quotas, which was beyond the statutory authority of Mr.
Morton as Secretary of the Interior.
80. Id.
81. Calvert Cliffs', 449 F.2d at 1113.
While it has not had occasion to review an impact statement, the Washington
supreme court has indicated that compliance with SEPA's requirements does neces-
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require a full "cost-benefit" analysis or an actual quantification or
valuation of environmental amenities.82
Impact statements will vary in size from a few pages to several vol-
umes.83 They are required to be "detailed"84 and reasonably "objec-
tive," but complete subjective impartiality is not required.8 5
8. Public Participation in the SEPA Process
SEPA contains no provisions requiring public hearings. Final im-
pact statements, and possibly draft statements, should be "made avail-
able" to the public. 86 This may require some affirmative action by an
agency to notify the public of the existance of the proposal and any
accompanying impact statement.87 Although an agency is not required
sitate consideration of alterations to mitigate environmental impacts as well as the
possibility of abandoning the project. See generally Eastlake.
82. Some analysis of the balance between costs and benefits is required. See, e.g.,
Conservation Soc'y of S. Vt. v. Sec'y of Transp., 362 F. Supp. 627 (D. Vt. 1973).
But this does not require placing a dollar value on environmental amenities. See
Cape Henry Bird Club v. Laird, 359 F. Supp. 404 (W.D. Va. 1973); Environmental
Defense Fund v. Armstrong, 352 F. Supp. 50 (W.D. Cal. 1972). See also Note, Cost-
Benefit Analysis and the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 24 STAN. L.
REV. 1092 (1972).
83. "Drafting a proper impact statement involves much more than filling in the
blanks on a government form. NEPA statements can and do vary, from relatively
short and simple analyses of the environmental effects of smaller projects to complex
multibillion dollar dimensions." Scientists' Institute for Public Information v. AEC,
481 F.2d 1079, 1092 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
84. Impact statements should go beyond mere conclusions or assertions and
indicate the basis for them. Silva v. Lynn, 482 F.2d 1282 (1st Cir. 1973).
85. Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers, 470 F.2d 289, 295-96(8th Cir. 1972). Some courts have also indicated that impact statements should be
written in language understandable by nontechnical people. See, e.g., Environmental
Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers, 348 F. Supp. 916 (N.D. Miss. 1972); Sierra
Club v. Froehlke, 359 F. Supp. 1289 (S.D. Tex. 1973).
86. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C.030(2)(d) provides in part: "Copies of such
statement and the comments and views of the appropriate federal, province, state,
and local agencies, which are authorized to develop and enforce environmental
standards, shall be made available to the governor, the department of ecology, the
ecological commission, and the public .... (emphasis added)
87. The policies and goals of SEPA are to be achieved by state and local govern-
ments "in cooperation with ...concerned 'public and private organizations." Id.§ 43.2 IC.020. The legislative history of NEPA makes it clear that decisions affecting
the environment are to be made "in the light of public scrutiny." 115 CONG. REC.
40,416 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 1969) (remarks of Senator Jackson). NEPA has been
interpreted by both the President and the Council on Environmental Quality to require
affirmative procedures to obtain the views of the public, including public hearings
"whenever appropriate." See Exec. Order No. 11,514, 3 C.F.R. 104 (1970); CEQ
Guidelines § 1500.7, 38 Fed. Reg. at 20,552-53.
In view of the above, as well as the requirement that impact statements be "made
available" to the public (see note 86 supra), some federal courts have required
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by SEPA to hold public hearings, 88 comments addressed to the agency
from the public should be accepted. All "responsible" or "reasonable"
comments by the public to a draft statement should be summarized
and evaluated in the final impact statement.8 9
C. The Substantive Provisions of SEPA90
The attention of both courts and governmental agencies has fo-
cused primarily upon SEPA's procedural requirements. This does not
agencies to affirmatively notify the public of proposals before them for NEPA review.
See Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1972); Daly v. Volpe, 350 F. Supp.
252 (W.D. Wash. 1972).
The 1973 amendments to SEPA (ch. 179, [1973] Wash. Laws 1st Ex. Sess.,
discussed in Part II infra) contain a provision for a public notice which is designed
to limit the time period for court challenges of agency decisions under SEPA. This
notice, coming after the agency's final decision, will not serve the purpose of making
an impact statement available for public comment prior to that time.
88. See, e.g., National Helium Corp. v. Morton, 455 F.2d 650 (10th Cir. 1971),
and Jicarilla Apache Tribe of Indians v. Morton, 471 F.2d 1275 (9th Cir. 1973),
finding no specific hearing requirement in NEPA.
89. Committee for Nuclear Responsibility v. Seaborg, 463 F.2d 783 (D.C. Cir.
1971); Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers, 325 F. Supp. 749
(E.D. Ark. 1971).
90. This section discusses the impact of SEPA upon the substantive law, or
legislative standards, to be applied by government agencies in decision-making. SEPA
may also have an impact upon the rights of individuals.
Perhaps the most important difference between NEPA and SEPA is found in
WASH. REV. CODE § 43.2 IC.020(3), which reads:
The legislature recognizes that each person has a fundamental and inalienable
right to a healthful environment and that each person has a responsibility to
contribute to the preservation and enhancement of the environment.
Identical language was included in the original version of NEPA as passed by the
Senate. The House version deleted the provision. The Act emerged from conference
with a similar provision, but without any reference to "fundamental and inalienable"
rights. The compromise resulted from "doubt on the part of the House conferees with
respect to the legal scope of the original Senate provision." H.R. Rep. No. 91-765,
91st Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1969). For a discussion of this change, and its possible impli-
cations, see Hanks & Hanks, An Environmental Bill of Rights: The Citizen Suit and
the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 2 ENVIRON. L. REV. 147, 169-72
(1971) (reprinted from 24 RUTGERS L. REV. 230 (1970)). This difference was noted
without comment by the court in Juanita Bay, 82 Wn. 2d at 68-69 n.5, 510 P.2d
at 1146-47. WASH. REV. CODE-§ 43.21I020(3) parll6ls an earlier enactmeni Ili-WASH.
REV. CODE § 43.21A.010 (part of the Act establishing the Department of Ecology)
which reads in part:
The legislature recognizes, and declares it to be the policy of this state, that it is a
fundamental and inalienable right of the people of the state of Washington
to live in a healthful and pleasant environment and to benefit from the proper
development and use of its natural resources.
Space limitations prohibit a full discussion of these provisions. They may. however,
be construed to provide standing to sue, to require judicial review of some local
legislative actions where none existed before, to create equitable causes of actions
against agencies, and even to create a new cause of action in tort.
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mean, however, that its policy statements are unimportant. Indeed,
once agencies develop mechanisms for compliance with SEPA's pro-
cedural requirements, attention must shift to the fundamental pur-
poses and policies of SEPA if it is to become something more than a
formbook exercise.
Recent NEPA decisions indicate that courts will seek to determine
whether a governmental agency has properly considered NEPA's poli-
cies and goals, and whether, in appropriate 6ases, the agency has im-
plemented those policies through the use of currently existing regula-
tory programs. 91 Judicial review of this sort should cause govern-
mental decision makers to examine their functions (including regula-
tory programs) critically in the light of the policies of SEPA.
SEPA's policies and goals are similar to those of NEPA. R.C.W.
§ 43.21C.020(1) declares it to be the continuing policy of the State
of Washingtbn
[T] o use all practicable means and measures, including financial and
technical assistance, in a manner calculated to: (a) Foster and promote
the general welfare; (b) to create and maintain conditions under which
man and nature can exist in productive harmony; and (c) fulfill the
social, economic, and other requirements of present and future genera-
tions of Washington citizens.
R.C.W. § 43.21C.020(2) provides seven specific goals for implement-
ing SEPA, all directed toward establishing a harmonious relationship
between man and the environment.92
91. In Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers, 470 F.2d 289, 297-98
(8th Cir. 1972), the court stated:
... The language of NEPA, as well as its legislative history, make it clear that
the Act is more than an environmental full-disclosure law. NEPA was intended
to effect substantive changes in decision making.
Thlae" unequivocal intent of NEPA is to require agencies to consider and give
effect to the environmental goals set forth in the Act, not just to file detailed
impact studies which will fill government archives.
92. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C.020(2) provides:
In order to carry out the policy set forth in this chapter, it is the continuing
responsibility of the state of Washington and all agencies of the state to use all
practicable means, consistent with other essential considerations of state policy,
to improve and coordinate plans, functions, programs, and resources to the end
that the state and its citizens may:
(a) Fulfill the responsibilities of each generation as trustee of the environment
for succeeding generations;
(b) Assure for all people of Washington safe, healthful, productive, and
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Numerous provisions of SEPA clearly mandate that its policies and
goals be given consideration in governmental decision making.
R.C.W.§§ 43.21C.030(2)(a) and (b) require full utilization of "a sys-
tematic, interdisciplinary approach" and development of "methods
and procedures" to insure consideration of environmental values in
decision making. Furthermore, SEPA requires governmental agencies
to "utilize ecological information in the planning and development of
natural resource oriented projects" 93 and to consider alternative uses
of available resources in cases of controversy. 94
SEPA also contains provisions which authorize and require govern-
mental agencies, once they have considered environmental values, to
apply the policies and goals of SEPA in their decision-making process.
R.C.W. § 43.21C.030 directs that the "policies, regulations, and laws
of the state of Washington shall be interpreted and administered in
accordance with the policies set forth in [SEPA]." R.C.W. §
43.21C.060 provides that "the policies and goals set forth in [SEPA]
esthetically and culturally pleasing surroundings;
(c) Attain the widest range of beneficial uses of the environment without
degradation, risk to health or safety, or other undesirable and unintended
consequences;
(d) Preserve important historic, cultural, and natural aspects of our national
heritage;
(e) Maintain, wherever possible, an environment which supports diversity and
variety of individual choice;
(f) Achieve a balance between population and resource use which will permit
high standards of living and a wide sharing of life's amenities; and
(g) Enhance the quality of renewable resources and approach the maximum
attainable recycling of depletable resources.
We note that the "responsibility" contained in WASH. ,REv. CODE § 43.21C.020(2)
applies only to the state and its agencies. The failure to include local governments
within that section appears to be an oversight. However, since local governments are
subject to the somewhat similar requirements of WASH. REV. CODE §§ 43.21C.030(2)(a),
(b), (e), (f) and (h), and since WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C.060 declares the
"'policies and goals" of SEPA are supplementary to the authorizations of all branches
of government, there is probably no difference in the effect of SEPA between state
and local agencies.
93. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C.030(2)(h). The Eastlake court stated, in pertinent
part:
[. . T] he permit-granting process is subject not only to the particular legisla-
tion authorizing it but also to those legislative enactments which require particular
additional duties to be fulfilled by the governmental body (such as SEPA). ...
[A] n objection to what the agency is required to do or not to do by virtue of the
subsequent enactment need not be sustained. (emphasis and parenthesis in the
original)
82 Wn. 2d at 497, 513 P.2d at 50.
94. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C.030(2)(e).
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are supplementary to those set forth in the legislative authorizations of
all branches of government of this state ... 95
These provisions make SEPA almost constitutional in scope. Vir-
tually all provisions of law requiring governmental permits, certifi-
cates or approvals for given activities contain standards to be applied
by the agency in determining whether to grant or issue such ap-
provals. The policies and goals of SEPA now supplement these stan-
dards and are to be considered and applied by the various agencies
just as if they were contained in their authorizing legislation.9 6
95. The legislature recognized that some existing legislation may be deficient or
inconsistent with the provisions of SEPA, and in WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C.040
directed agencies administering such provisions to propose to -the Governor measures
necessary to eliminate these deficiencies or inconsistencies. This provision should
rarely excuse compliance with the policies of SEPA. Only those direct conflicts which
"prohibit full compliance" will furnish an excuse for noncompliance, and these will
rarely occur. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C.040; cf., United States v. Students
Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 409 U.S. 1073 (1973);
King County Economic Community Development Ass'n v. Hardin, 478 F.2d 478
(9th Cir. 1973); Alabama Gas Corp. v. FPC, 476 F.2d 142 (5th Cir. 1973).
Federal courts have held that certain functions performed by the Environmental
Protection Agency under the Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-58 Supp. II, 1972)
are exempt from the impact statement requirements of NEPA, although perhaps not
the substantive requirements. The courts relied primarily upon the legislative history
of NEPA to the effect that it was not intended to change the duties of agencies with
environmental protection authority. See Anaconda Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 482 F.2d 1301
(10th Cir. 1973); Buckeye Power v. EPA, 481 F.2d 162 (6th Cir. 1973).
WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C.030 reads in pertinent part:
The legislature authorizes and directs that, to the fullest extent possible: ...
(2) [A] 11 branches of government of this state including state agencies, municipal
and public corporations, and counties shall:
(a) Utilize a systematic, interdisciplinary approach which will insure the
integrated use of the natural and social sciences and the environmental design
arts in planning and in decision-making which may have an impact on man's
environment;
(b) Identify and develop methods and procedures, in consultation with the
department of ecology and the ecological commission, which will insure that
presently unquantified environmental amenities and values will be given appropriate
consideration in decision-making along with economic and technical considerations
.... (emphasis added)
96. See also Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1112
(D.C. Cir. 1971), which contains the following discussion of the similar provisions
of NEPA:
NEPA, first of all, makes environmental protection a part of the mandate of
every federal agency and department. The Atomic Energy Commission, for
example, had continually asserted, prior to NEPA, that it had no statutory
authority to concern itself with the adverse environmental effects of its actions.
Now, however, its hands are no longer tied. It is not only permitted, but com-
pelled, to take environmental values into account. Perhaps the greatest importance
of NEPA is to require the Atomic Energy Commission and other agencies to
consider environmental issues just as they consider other matters with their
mandates. (emphasis in original; footnote omitted)
The prime sponsor of NEPA, Senator Jackson, stated: 'The bill specifically provides
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The decisions of the Washington courts are in accord with this
analysis. In Juanita Bay the Washington Court of Appeals held that the
policies and goals of SEPA introduce elements of discretion into ac-
tions of local government formerly considered purely ministerial. In
Stempel the Washington Supreme Court held that SEPA required the
Department of Water Resources to consider the possibility of pollu-
tion of a lake from the septic tanks of a proposed resort development
before issuing a water right permit to the development, even though
the statutory standards governing issuance of that permit did not men-
tion pollution. 97 In Eastlake the court indicated that while the sub-
stantive decision by an agency is not dictated by SEPA, approval of a
project where adverse environmental impact is indicated "may reveal
an abuse of discretion by the public agency." 98
Thus, the policies and goals of SEPA have "seeped" into the ex-
isting legislative authorizations of nearly all governmental regulatory
programs. Environmental values not only must be considered by
agencies in the decision-making process but must be acted upon in
appropriate cases. In some instances, agencies will be justified in
denying applications for licenses, permits or authorizations upon the
basis of SEPA even though their authorizing legislation makes no refer-
ence to environmental considerations. 99 Federal courts have recog-
that its provisions are supplemental to the existing mandates and authorizations of
all federal agencies. This constitutes a statutory enlargement of the responsibilities
and the concerns of all instrumentalities of the Federal Government." 115 Cong. Rec.
19,009 (daily ed. July 10, 1969). A detailed discussion of the legislative history of
the relevant provisions of NEPA is contained in Hanks & Hanks, An Environmental
Bill of Rights: The Citizen Suit and the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969,
2 ENVIRON. L. REV. 147 (1971) (reprinted from 24 RUTGERS L. REV. 230 (1970)).
97. The decision was also based upon application of the Water Resources Act of
1971, WASH. REV. CODE ch. 90.54, to the permit in question. 82 Wn. 2d at 116-17.
508 P.2d at 171-72.
98. 82 Wn. 2d at 497, 513 P.2d at 49. The court stated, in dicta:
The particular choice ultimately arrived at, be it abandonment, alteration, or
permission to complete construction, is not dictated by SEPA. 6 It is the evaluation
of pertinent environmental factors that is mandated.
Footnote 6 of the opinion reads in part:
Though a substantive result is not dictated by SEPA where adverse environmental
impact is indicated, the approval of such a project may reveal an abuse of
discretion by the public agency where mitigation or avoidance of damage was
possible.
99. See Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1970); cf. Bankers Life & Casualty
Co. v. Village of North Palm Beach, 469 F.2d 994 (5th Cir. 1972). See also Calvert
Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
In theory NEPA is a more potent force in the hands of government than in the
hands of parties suing the government. Its potential in this respect has not yet
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nized that the nearly identical provisions of NEPA have a similar ef-
fect.100
II. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF COMPLIANCE WITH SEPA
Both Washington and federal courts require strict compliance with
the procedural mandates of SEPA and NEPA, and obvious failures to
follow these mandates will result in reversal or remand. 101 Some of
SEPA's requirements, however, are not mechanical but require the
exercise of judgment by governmental agencies. Two areas in which
judgment is required in applying SEPA are the threshold determina-
tion of whether to prepare an impact statement and the substantive
agency decision or order for which the impact statement was pre-
pared. These areas present problems in establishing standards for judi-
cial review.
begun to be realized, but cases like Zabel v. Tabb, the first case in which a federal
agency sought to assert its NEPA mandate, in the long run may be more impor-
tant for better federal decision making than the suits against the government.
F. ANDERSON, supra note 17, at 246-47 (footnote omitted).
100. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 5 BNA ENVIRON. REP. 1920 (7th Cir. 1973);
Conservation Council of N.C. v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d 664 (4th Cir. 1973); Life of the
Land v. Brinegar, 485 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1973); Environmental Defense Fund v.
Corps of Engineers, 470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1972); Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating
Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
In Greene County Planning Bd. v. FPC, 455 F.2d 412, 425 (2d Cir. 1973), the
court indicated in dicta that it might have halted construction on a transmission line
"if there were significant potential for subversion of the substantive policies expressed
in NEPA."
Representative district court opinions include Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 359 F. Supp.
1289 (S.D. Tex. 1973); Cape Henry Bird Club v. Laird, 359 F. Supp. 404 (W.D. Va.
1973); Environmental Defense Fund v. TVA, 5 BNA ENVIRON. REP. 1183 (E.D.
Tenn. 1973).
Federal courts are not in complete accord as to the substantive impact of NEPA.
See, e.g., Upper Pecos Ass'n v. Stans, 452 F.2d 1233, 1236 (10th Cir. 1971) ("The
mandates of the N.E.P.A. pertain to procedure and not to substance .... ; Pizitz v.
Volpe, 467 F.2d 208 (5th Cir. 1972), affg per curiam, 4 BNA ENVIRON. REP. 1195
(M.D. Ala. 1972), which stated that the requirements of NEPA "provide only pro-
cedural remedies as opposed to substantive rights and that the function of the court
in such cases is limited to ensuring that the procedural requirements of the Act are
satisfied." Id. at 1196. Several district court opinions, particularly in earlier cases, have
held that NEPA does not affect substantive law. See generally Arnold, The Substan-
tive Right to Environmental Quality Under the National Environmental Policy Act,
3 ENVIRON. L. REP. 50,028 (1973); Note, Substantive Review Under the National
Environmental Policy Act: EDF v. Corps of Engineers, 3 ECOL. L.Q. 173 (1973).
101. See, e.g., Eastlake, 82 Wn. 2d at 490, 513 P.2d at 46.
The procedural duties imposed by SEPA-full consideration to environmental
protection-are to be exercised to the fullest extent possible to insure that the
"attempt by the people to shape their future environment by deliberation, not de-
fault" will be realized.
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The scope of judicial review under NEPA differs among the federal
courts,' 02 but trends may be identified in recent decisions. Washington
courts have not had occasion to thoroughly discuss the scope of re-
view of governmental agency decisions under SEPA. Because of dif-
ferences between federal and state administrative law, state decisions
as to the scope of review may not completely parallel federal deci-
sions.
A. Judicial Review of Threshold Determinations
If an agency decides that no impact statement is required, how
should a court review that decision? While federal courts have given
varying answers, 10 3 the trend of the federal decisions appears to recog-
nize that a threshold determination involves both factual and legal
questions.104 Federal courts have shunned the "rational basis" test
102. As stated in Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 359 F. Supp. 1289, 1332 (S.D. Tex.
1973): "The role of District Courts in reviewing decisions of federal agencies under
NEPA has not been clearly enunciated, and it appears that differing standards have
been used."
103. The standard of review applied to a negative threshold determination is
dependent in part upon whether such a determination is viewed as a question of law.
a mixed question of fact and law, or as a question of fact.
Federal courts often substitute their judgment for that of the agency on a question
of law. See 4 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 30.14 (1958) [hereinafter cited as
K. DAVIS]. For an example of a NEPA opinion substituting judgment as to a threshold
determination, see Natural Resources Defense Council v. Grant, 341 F. Supp. 356.
366 (E.D. N.C. 1972).
Agency decisions on mixed questions of fact and law may be upheld if they have
"warrant in the record and rational basis in law," or again, the courts may substitute
their judgment for that of the agency. See K. DAVIS supra. The Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit may have applied the "rational basis" test to a NEPA determination
in King County Economic Development Ass'n v. Hardin, 478 F.2d 478 (9th Cir. 1973).
Federal courts often apply the "substantial evidence" test to agency factual deter-
minations. even when the applicable statute calls for some other form of judicial
review. See K. DAVIS § 29.01 supra. Federal courts reviewing NEPA threshold
determinations, however, influenced by the decision of the United States Supreme
Court in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971), instead have
often applied the "arbitrary and capricious" test, which includes elements of factual
and legal review. See Note, Substantive Review Under the National Environmental
Policy Act: EDF v. Corps of Engineers, 3 ECOL. L.Q. 173, 180-81 (1973).
104. In Scientists' Institute for Pub. Information v. AEC, 481 F.2d 1079, 1095
(D.C. Cir. 1973), the court explained its formulation of review standards to be
applied to the question of whether an impact statement is needed for an ongoing
research program:
The decision whether the time is ripe for a NEPA statement on an overall
research and development program is a mixed question of law and of fact. It
concerns a question of law as to interpretation of the statutory phrase "major
Federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment"....
[W] e interpret the statute to provide for a balancing approach which takes
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normally applied to mixed questions of fact and law105 and, instead,
have attempted to separate the legal issues and factual issues inherent
in a threshold determination. 106 Legal issues are decided by the appel-
late courts de novo, the primary legal issues being the interpretation of
"significantly" and "major actions" in the phrase, "major actions signi-
ficantly affecting the quality of the environment."' 07 Of course, factual
issues are not decided de novo by appellate courts, but by manipulating
the law-fact dichotomy, the federal courts have been able to adjust
almost at will the scope of review for NEPA cases.' 08
Assuming the court's interpretation of the applicable law has not
resolved the case (in many cases it will), the agency's factual determi-
nations and its application of the law to the facts will normally be
tested by the "arbitrary and capricious" standard. 109 Relying upon the
into account the Act's policies in favor of information which is both meaningful
and timely. In addition, the decision involves a question of fact as to application
of that balancing test to the realities of a specific program at a specific time.
The court went on to consider whether the "rational basis" or "reasonableness"
standard should be applied, and concluded that "any differences between the two
were largely irrelevant.., in the context of the instant case." Id. at 1096.
105. See, e.g., NLRB v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. 111 (1944), which would
uphold an agency determination having warrant in the record and a reasonable basis
in law; Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402 (1941), calling for affirmance of agency action
if it has a rational basis. See generally Nathanson, Administrative Discretion in the
Interpretation of Statutes, 3 VAND. L. REV. 470, 473-75 (1950).
106. See, e.g., Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823, 829 (2d Cir. 1972) which
expressly rejects the rational basis test in favor of the arbitrary and capricious standard
of review.
107. See Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823, 828 (2d Cir. 1972):
The action involves both a question of law-the meaning of the word "signifi-
cantly" in the statutory phrase "significantly affecting the quality of the human
environment"-and a question of fact-whether the MCC will have a "signifi-
cantly" adverse environmental impact. Strickly speaking, our function as a
reviewing court is to determine de novo "all relevant questions of law ......
The court went on to add legal substance to the term "significantly," id. at 830-31:
[W] e are persuaded that in deciding whether a major federal action will "signifi-
cantly" affect the quality of the human environment the agency in charge, although
vested with broad discretion, should normally be required to review the proposed
action in light of at.least two relevant factors: (1) the extent to which the action
will cause adverse environmental effects in excess of those created by existing
uses in the area affected by it, and (2) the absolute quantitative adverse environ-
mental effects of the action itself, including the cumulative harm that results
from its contribution to existing adverse conditions or uses in the affected area.
108. Any court, while defining the law applicable to an administrative decision,
may so reduce the available options as to leave the administrator little or no room
for discretion. This appears to be what the Supreme Court did in Citizens to Preserve
Overton Park v. Volpe, supra note 103. See Note, Citizens to Preserve Overton Park
v. Volpe: Environmental Law and the Scope of Judicial Review, 24 STAN. L. REv.
1117 (1972).
109. See Hanly v. Kleindienst, supra note 107.
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Supreme Court's decision in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v.
Volpe, 110 some federal courts have utilized a "reasonableness" stan-
dard to test a negative threshold determination,' which requires the
reviewing court to determine whether the agency "reasonably con-
cluded that the particular project would have no effects which would
significantly degrade our environmental quality."'112 Although it is
theoretically a subcategory of the arbitrary and capricious standard,
federal courts have indicated that the reasonableness standard is a
more rigorous standard of judicial review than the arbitrary and ca-
pricious test as normally applied; 113 likewise they have indicated it is
more pervasive than the well-known "substantial evidence test."' 14
Although the Washington court has shown an inclination to substi-
tute its judgment for that of governmental agencies on the question of
whether an environmental impact statement is required, thus treating
the question as solely an issue of law, 1 5 the precise issue of the scope
of review of negative threshold determinations has not been argued
before the court. Once the question is presented squarely there is no
110. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
111. Beginning from the "arbitrary and capricious" standard as expressed in
Overton Park, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Save Our Ten Acres v.
Kreger, 472 F.2d 463, 466-67 (5th Cir. 1973), enunciated a standard of judicial
review applicable to threshold determinations:
Under the review standard we hold is required, the court must first determine
whether the plaintiff has alleged facts which, if true, show that the recommended
project would materially degrade any aspect of environmental quality.
• * * [If these allegations are made] the court should proceed to examine and
weigh the evidence of both the plaintiff and the agency to determine whether
the agency reasonably concluded that the particular project would have no
effects which would significantly degrade our environmental quality. This inquiry
must not necessarily be limited to consideration of the administrative record.
This "reasonableness standard" was applied again by the Fifth Circuit in Hiram
Clarke Civic Club v. Lynn, 476 F.2d 421 (5th Cir. 1973).
Although the "reasonableness standard" was considered as a subcategory of the
"arbitrary and capricious" test by the Fifth Circuit, the Tenth Circuit has applied it
as an independent and more pervasive standard of judicial review. See Wyoming
Outdoor Coordinating Council v. Butz, 484 F.2d 1244 ( 10th Cir. 1973).
112. Save Our Ten Acres v. Kreger, 472 F.2d at 467.
113. See, e.g., Wyoming Outdoor Cordinating Council v. Butz, supra note I11.
114. See Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v. FPC, 407 U.S. 926, 931 (1972)
(Douglas, J., dissenting).
115. In Loveless the court was considering the timing of an impact statement.
Having determined that the government action was of a nature that would require an
impact statement if the project significantly affected the environment, the court then
stated: "No party to this appeal asserts that the project will not significantly affect
the environment." 82 Wn. 2d at 764, 513 P.2d at 1029. Therefore, an impact state-
ment was required. There is no indication in the opinion that the factual issues
involved in determining the environmental significance of the proposal were considered
either by the local government or by the trial court. A similar approach appears to
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reason to expect a significant deviation from the federal decisions,
except perhaps that issues identified as factual may be reviewed under
a standard narrower than that applied in the federal cases.' 16 Like the
federal courts, however, the Washington courts probably will define
the applicable law so as to maintain thorough judicial scrutiny of
agency negative threshold determinations. Such a position under
SEPA is understandable and desirable because a negative threshold
determination, once affirmed, precludes the full environmental review
contemplated by the "detailed statement" requirement of SEPA.
B. Judicial Review of the Substantive Governmental Agency
Decision for Which the Impact Statement Was Prepared
The true mettle of NEPA and SEPA will be determined by judicial
review of agency decisions-when the agency has considered all rele-
have been taken in Eastlake where the environmental significance of the proposal was
found to be "undisputed." 82 Wn. 2d at 488, 513 P.2d at 45.
Absent any findings on the issue below, the court's resolution of the significance
question for the first time at the appellate level would seem to indicate that the court
considered it a question of law-a holding which would be inconsistent with the
weight of federal authority. The factual issues inherent in determining environmental
significance, however, did not appear to be central issues in Loveless and Eastlake,
and the court's treatment of that issue in those cases may not preclude a more
complete consideration of the issue in later cases.
116. Administrative decisions of both state and local government agencies not
subject to the state Administrative Procedure Act are reviewable under the "arbitrary
and capricious" standard. The factual review standard appears to be limited to a
consideration of whether there was competent or substantial evidence to support the
administrative decision. See, e.g., State ex rel. Perry v. Seattle, 69 Wn. 2d 816, 420
P.2d 704 (1966); Deaconess Hosp. v. Wash. State Highway Comm'n, 66 Wn. 2d
378, 403 P.2d 54 (1965).
Local government zoning is considered legislative action, but is subject to review
under the arbitrary and capricious standard. Action may not be taken in disregard of
the facts; however, if the decision is "fairly debatable" or where there is room for an
"honest difference of opinion" as to the desirability of the action, then it is not
arbitrary and capricious. See, e.g., Farrell v. Seattle, 75 Wn. 2d 540,452 P.2d 965 (1969).
The substantial evidence test was expressly rejected (as a matter of construction of
the federal Administrative Procedure Act) in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v.
Volpe, supra note 103. Federal decisions using Overton Park as the standard of review
in NEPA cases will therefore- be applying a broader standard than state courts relying
upon the substantial evidence test or something similar in SEPA cases.
State courts, however, frequently apply an ill-defined "reasonableness" standard in
reviewing administrative decisions. See, e.g., Deaconess Hosp., 66 Wn. 2d at 405, 403
P.2d at 70: "Were [the agency's] actions in the last analysis rational, that is, based
upon reasonable choice supported by facts and evidence . . . ?" The authors have
found no Washington decision relying upon "reasonableness" as an independent ground
for reversal; therefore, comparison of this standard with the reasonableness standard
applied in federal cases such as Save Our Ten Acres v Kreger, supra note 112, is
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vant environmental factors and has prepared an adequate and timely
environmental impact statement-to go ahead with projects despite
known adverse environmental effects. While some courts state that
NEPA is procedural only and thus they will not review substantive
governmental agency decisions, the trend of the federal courts seems
to be toward undertaking a limited judicial review of the substantive
agency decision to ascertain whether the agency considered the bal-
ancing of environmental costs and benefits in its decision-making
process as contemplated by NEPA. 117 The Washington Supreme Court,
in dicta, has indicated that it will do likewise.' 18
The legal rules governing federal judicial review of these substan-
tive agency decisions are the same as those governing review of
threshold determinations. The tenor of the judicial opinions, however,
may be much different. Application of NEPA to substantive govern-
mental agency decisions requires a balancing of environmental costs
against other social goals which may be advanced by a proposal. An
agency may be required to apply often conflicting policies contained
in several pieces of applicable legislation, including NEPA, to a com-
plex set of facts. Under such circumstances, courts are less likely to
dictate agency behavior by defining the controversy as a question of
law and are more likely to stress the narrow nature of their review
and to define the controversy as factual or discretionary.
The scope of federal review applied to substantive governmental
decisions is usually that set forth in Overton Park. As applied in
NEPA cases, 119 Overton Park requires that the responsible official
difficult. Washington courts could, however, utilize a reasonableness test to apply a
more searching standard of judicial review to SEPA decisions in a manner similar to
that of the federal courts.
Review of administrative decisions arising under the state Administrative Procedure
Act should be similar to that provided by Overton Park. See note 127 infra.
117. See note 100 supra. Those decisions which recognize and give effect to the
substantive mandates of NEPA normally provide some judicial review of the agency's
integration of these mandates into its decision-making process.
118. See Eastlake, quoted in note 98 supra.
119. The Fourth, Seventh, Eighth and Ninth Circuits have applied the standard
of review set forth in Overton Park to review of agencies' substantive decisions in
NEPA cases. See Sierra Club v. Froehlke, supra note 100; Life of the Land v.
Brinegar, 485 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1973); Conservation Council of N.C. v. Froehlke,
473 F.2d 664 (4th Cir. 1973); Environmental Defense Fund v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d
346 (8th Cir. 1972); Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers, 470 F.2d
289 (8th Cir. 1972).
The District of Columbia Circuit has indicated in dictum that a limited judicial
review of agency substantive decisions is available. Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating
Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1971). The Second Circuit has done
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actually consider environmental factors and give them appropriate
weight in reaching his decision; 120 whether the responsible official has
done so may be determined by the courts as a matter of law. 1 1 As-
suming the evidence indicates that the responsible official has satisfied
these legal requirements, the federal courts under NEPA will then
conduct a "substantial inquiry" into the substantive agency decision
under the invigorated "arbitrary and capricious" standard of Overton
Park, which requires the reviewing court to consider "whether there
has been a clear error of judgment."'1 22
Judicial review of governmental agency decisions under the Wash-
ington Administrative Procedure Act (WAPA)123 should parallel this
approach. Under WAPA a court may reverse an agency decision as
"clearly erroneous"' 24 if the court has a "definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has been committed."' 25 A Washington court may find
an agency decision to be "clearly erroneous" even if there is substan-
tial evidence to support it.126 The WAPA standard, therefore, appears
similar, if not identical, to the "clear error" test enunciated in Overton
Park.127
likewise. Greene County Planning Bd. v. FPC, 455 F.2d 412 (2d Cir. 1973).
The Second, Fifth and Tenth Circuits have applied Overton Park to judicial review
of negative threshold determinations, but not to review of substantive agency decisions.
Wyoming Outdoor Coordinating Council v. Butz, 484 F.2d 1244 (10th Cir. 1973);
Save Our Ten Acres v. Kreger, 472 F.2d 463 (5th Cir. 1973); Hanly v. Kleindienst,
471 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1972). In Save Our Ten Acres v. Kreger, 472 F.2d at 467,
the court indicated "that it is not the province of the courts to review any actual
decision on the merits ... as to the desirability vel non of the project." See also
Pizitz v. Volpe, supra note 100.
120. See Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers, supra note 91.
121. These determinations must be made by a reviewing court in determining
whether the administrator understood and acted within the scope of his authority.
Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 415-16; but see Note, Citizens to Preserve Overton
Park, Inc. v. Volpe: Environmental Law and the Scope of Judicial Review, 24
STAN. L. REV. 1117, 1131-33 (1972).
122. Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 416. The Eighth Circuit in Environmental Defense
Fund v. Corps of Engineers further stated, 470 F.2d at 300:
The court must then determine, according to the standards set forth in §§ 101(b)
and 102(1) of the Act [corresponding to WASH. REV. CODE §§ 43.21C.020(2)
& .030(1) of SEPA], whether "the actual balance of costs and benefits that was
struck was arbitrary or clearly gave insufficient weight to environmental values."
[quoting Calvert Cliffs', 449 F.2d at 1115]
123. WASH. REV. CODE ch. 34.04 (1963).
124. Id. § 34.04.130(6)(e) (Supp. 1972).
125. Ancheta v. Daly, 77 Wn. 2d 255, 259-60,461 P.2d 531,534 (1969).
126. Id.
127. The cases cited by the Supreme Court in Overton Park in support of the
"clear error" test equated that test with the clearly erroneous test. 401 U.S. at 416.
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Administrative decisions of both state and local governmental agencies
not governed by WAPA are subject to the "arbitrary and capricious"
standard of review, 128 which is apparently narrower than the federal
standard and is clearly narrower than the WAPA standard.' 29 Deci-
sions of governmental agencies under this standard must be in accord
with the applicable law,130 must not be made upon an inherently
wrong basis 31 and must be reasonable. 132 The factual review permitted
under this standard, however, is narrow, and governmental agency
decisions which are supported by competent or substantial evidence
generally will not be overturned. 133 A decision must be "willful
and unreasoning ... in disregard of the facts and circumstances" '13 4
to be arbitrary and capricious. The intricate balancing process
of environmental costs and benefits contemplated by SEPA for
government decision making is not likely to be well defined by the
courts as a matter of law. Consequently, this narrow standard of
factual review may determine the character of judicial review of sub-
stantive governmental decisions in non-WAPA cases.
III. THE 1973 AMENDMENTS TO SEPA
The importance of SEPA was not immediately apparent to those
affected by its requirements.1 35 Not until September of 1972, when
128. See note 116 supra.
129. The Washington APA utilizes the clearly erroneous test which is equivalent
to the federal clear error test. The arbitrary and capricious standard is narrower than
the clearly erroneous standard. Ancheta v. Daly, supra note 125.
130. A court must ascertain the scope of the statutory functions of the adminis-
trator and determine whether these functions have been properly performed. State
ex rel. Cosmopolis Consolidated School Dist. 99 v. Bruno, 61 Wn. 2d 461, 378
P.2d 691 (1963).
131. See State ex rel. Perry v. Seattle, 62 Wn. 2d 891, 384 P.2d 874 (1963).
132. See note 116 supra. The "reasonableness" of a local zoning action also
figured into the decision in Smith v. Skagit County, 75 Wn. 2d 715, 453 P.2d 832 (1969).
133. See note 116 supra. A court, rather than requiring "substantial evidence" to
satisfy the arbitrary and capricious test, may require "competent" evidence or even a
"scintilla." See State ex rel. Perry v. Seattle, 62 Wn. 2d at 894, 384 P.2d at 876. On
the other hand, as discussed in note 116 supra, courts considering the strong policy
statements of SEPA may grant some substance to the "reasonableness" standard they
now apply to local government decisions, and review local government SEPA decisions
in a manner approximating the "reasonableness" standard applied in Federal NEPA cases.
134. Northern Pac. Transp. Co. v. Util. & Transp. Comm'n, 69 Wn. 2d 472, 479,
418 P.2d 735, 740(1966).
135. An indicator of the lack of knowledge of SEPA is that during the first six
months of SEPA's life, only seven "detailed statements" were filed with the Department
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the California Supreme Court rendered its landmark decision in Friends
of Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors of Mono County,136 did
any major segment of Washington's private sector begin to inquire
about SEPA.137 Knowledge of the holding in Friends of Mammoth
(that California's SEPA-like Environmental Quality Act 38 applied not
only to government projects but to the regulation of private projects
as well) caused private interests in Washington, especially those in-
volved in promoting and financing real esfate developments, to ex-
press apprehensions over SEPA's implications. 3 9 No longer was SEPA
just an annoying statute hung around the necks of project-oriented
governmental agencies such as Washington's Department of High-
ways. 40 With its threats of delay, higher costs, loss of proposed proj-
ects and protracted litigation, SEPA was now a full-fledged enemy of
a wide range of private interests.
The first proposals for substantial amendments to SEPA were intro-
duced during the regular session of 1973. They included S.B. 2749
and H.B. 1082, supported by the Department of Highways, and S.B.
2531, supported by private real estate and money lending interests.
After numerous public hearings, S.B. 2531 was reported out by the
Senate Ecology Committee and, with some modifications, ultimately
became law as Chapter 179, Laws of 1973.141
of Ecology as provided by WASH. REv. CODE § 43.21C.030. By the end of 1973, 887
"detailed statements" had been filed.
136. 8 Cal. 3d 1, 500 P.2d 1360, 104 Cal. Rptr. 16, as modified, 8 Cal. 3d 247,
502 P.2d 1049, 104 Cal. Rptr. 761 (1972).
137. The California press gave substantial coverage, and thus publicity, to the
Friends of Mammoth case. Examples include Court Ruling on Ecology Reports on
Private Projects Stirs Confusion, L.A. Times, Oct. 1, 1972, at 8; Economic Disaster
Feared over State Construction Ruling, id., Oct. 11, 1972, at 1.
138. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§21000-174 (West Supp. 1973).
139. The express holding of the California supreme court in Friends of Mam-
moth was that a building permit issued by Mono County for a condominium in a ski
resort area was invalid because the county had not prepared and considered an
impact statement, as required by the state's Environment Quality Act, prior to a
decision on issuance of the permit.
The holding of Friends of Mammoth should have come as no surprise to those who
followed NEPA opinions of the federal courts issued previously such as Kalur v.
Resor, 335 F. Supp. I (D.D.C. 1971). See also CEQ Guidelines § 1500.6(b), 38
Fed. Reg. at 20,551.
140. The Department of Highways is required not only to meet the requirements
of SEPA, but it must satisfy the requirements of another environmental protection
statute as well. See WASH. REV. CODE 99 47.04.110-.130 (Supp. 1972). No other
state or local agency has been given such special treatment by the Legislature.
141. See note 153 infra.
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The 1973 amendments deal with three unrelated concerns in-
volving SEPA. Section 1 of Chapter 179 is a very limited response by
the legislature to the suggestion that there are certain categories of
actions by government which do not, by their very nature, constitute a
"major action significantly affecting the quality of the environment."
This Section provides:
The department of ecology shall, within forty-five days from the
effective date of this act, after notice and hearing, promulgate rules
and regulations pursuant to chapter 34.04 RCW to establish classifica-
tions and categories of building permits and acts of governmental
agencies concerning an individual single family residence, which clas-
sification and category shall be exempt from the "detailed statement"
required by RCW 43.21C.030. Building permits and acts not so clas-
sified shall not be presumed to either require or not require a "detailed
statement".
The direct value of this language in resolving any uncertainties over
the "detailed statement" requirements of SEPA is questionable; how-
ever, the indirect implications of Section 1 are undoubtedly more sig-
nificant.
At the time of the passage of Chapter 179, it was still argued by
some that decisions on applications for building permits and permits
under other similar regulatory programs, often thought of as minis-
terial, were not subject to the detailed statement requirements of
SEPA. Section 1 washes away any lingering doubts on this contention
by evidencing clear legislative intent that such decisions are poten-
tially subject to the detailed statement preparation requirements of
SEPA. Likewise, this Section eliminates any suggestion that SEPA
does not apply to private projects. 142 In addition, Section 1 also im-
142. Ch. 179, [1973] Wash. Laws 1st Ex. Sess. was signed by the Governor on
March 20, 1973. Nine days thereafter the Washington supreme court held in Stempel
that SEPA was applicable to decisions under the state's Water Code authorizing,
through permits, the construction of water diversion works and the withdrawal of
public waters for use in a private real estate development.
143. On August 14, 1973, the Department of Ecology adopted WASH. AD. CODE
ch. 173-34 (1973). This Chapter exempts all actions pertaining to individual single
family residences from the detailed statement preparation requirements of SEPA
except those proposed in "sensitive areas." Id. § 173-34-020(2) defines sensitive
areas as:
... [A] ny area which:
(a) contains significant threats to the environment arising from earth slides,
avalanches, or flooding from a flood of a frequency expected to recur on the
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plies that governmental agency decisions concerning activities of small
size and relatively limited geographic environmental impact, such as
the building of an individual single family dwelling, may require envi-
ronmental impact statements in some circumstances. 143 Furthermore,
this Section establishes the precedent of providing the Department of
Ecology with rule-making authority, at least with respect to single
family dwellings, to interpret SEPA in a manner which binds other
agencies of state and local government. 44 This is a power which the
Department of Ecology did not previously possess. Finally, the ex-
press grant of an exempting power to the Department of Ecology may
conflict with, and place a cloud of invalidity over, local government
ordinances which exempt certain classes of activities from the "de-
tailed statement" requirements of SEPA. 145
Section 2 of Chapter 179 establishes a procedure designed to elimi-
nate belated challenges to a governmentally approved private project
based upon a failure to comply with the "detailed statement" require-
ments of SEPA.146 This Section directs an applicant who has obtained
governmental approval of a private project which constitutes a "major
action significantly affecting the quality of the environment" to pub-
lish a notice of the governmental action in a newspaper of general cir-
average of once every one hundred years or a flood magnitude which has a
one percent chance of occurring in any given year; or
(b) contains any special natural values such as a marsh land, or habitation
place of substantial concentrations of flora or fauna or of rare or endangered
species of flora or fauna or,
(c) is being given special attention because of a problem of critically low or
declining resource supply or quality, or
(d) contains elements having significant aesthetic, recreational or historical
value; or
(e) is within "shorelines of the state" as defined in the Shoreline Management
Act of 1971.
One consequence of chapter 173-34 is that, with regard to governmental actions
pertaining to individual single family residences, a new pre-threshold decision must
be made; i.e., is the proposed single family dwelling within a sensitive area?
144. Section 1 can be interpreted to extend beyond individual single family
residences if "classifications and categories of building permits" is interpreted as a
classification separate from "acts of governmental agencies concerning an individual
single family residence."
145. King County has, for example, exempted numerous categories of govern-
mental actions from SEPA's detailed statement requirements including, but not
limited to, individual single family residences. See KING COUNTY, WASH., CODE
§ 20.44.090 (1973).
146. The doctrine of laches has usually been regarded with disfavor, at least in
the NEPA cases. Compare Arlington Coalition on Transp. v. Volpe, 458 F.2d 1323
(4th Cir. 1972) with Clark v. Volpe, 461 F.2d 1266 (5th.Cir. 1972).
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culation in the area of the project as well as in the area of the prin-
cipal offices of the agency taking the action. Thereafter, any suits
challenging the project based on the contention that the governmental
agency's actions did not comply with SEPA are barred unless they are
initiated within 60 days from the last date of publication of the notice. 47
While the notice provision of this section only applies expressly
to "a major action significantly affecting the quality of the environ-
ment," publishing notice of a governmental agency action even
though it is preceded by a negative declaration should also bar most
suits challenging compliance with SEPA initiated more than 60 days
after the last date of publication. Although the governmental agency
has determined in this instance that the action in question is not a
major action which significantly affects the environment, any plaintiff
seeking judicial review to require preparation of an environmental
impact statement will have to allege that the action was, in fact, a
major action significantly affecting the quality of the environment. If
the court overrules the governmental agency's decision and holds that
the action was a major action significantly affecting the environment,
then the suit will be barred if 60 days has elapsed; if the court agrees
with the governmental agency and holds that the action was not a
major action significantly affecting the environment, then an impact
statement did not need to be prepared in any event. 148
The negative declaration situation, however, places the developer
who wishes to invoke the statutory bar in a difficult situation. While
publishing the notice provided for in Section 2 may have the effect of
prohibiting any challenge initiated more than 60 days after the last
147. Ch. 179, § 2, [1973] Wash. Laws 1st Ex. Sess., provides:
Any action to set aside, enjoin, review, or otherwise challenge any such action
of a governmental agency with respect to any private project on grounds of
noncompliance with the provisions of this chapter shall be commenced within
sixty days from the final date of publication of notice of such action, or be barred.
148. This reasoning would not apply to a cause of action based upon the sub-
stantive provisions of SEPA. Agencies are required to follow the policies of SEPA,
and to give environmental values appropriate consideration "to the fullest extent
possible." WASH. REV. CODE §§ 43.21C.030(1), (2) (b). Agencies are directed to use
"all practicable means" to carry out the goals of id. § 43.21C.020(2). Neither of these
duties is limited to "major actions significantly affecting the quality of the environment"
which applies only to the impact statement requirement of id. § 43.21C.030(2) (c).
In comparison with the uncertain draftsmanship of the statutory bar in Section 2,
see the specificity of the provision in California's Environmental Quality Act of 1970,
CAL. PuB. RES. CODE § 21167 (West Supp. 1973).
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date of publication, such publication invites a challenge to the validity
of a permit within the 60-day period. 149
The policy of Section 2 of bringing to the public's attention govern-
mental actions involving "major actions significantly affecting the
quality of the environment" is praiseworthy. For those who promoted
this provision on the grounds it would provide certainty and eliminate
litigation, however, a disappointment may-be in the offing. Over the
years, the authors have observed that most governmental actions under
regulatory programs pertaining to individual private projects are not
noticed by the public. The enactment of SEPA has not markedly
changed this situation. As a result, time periods for challenging such
actions, more often than not, slip silently by. Through the broadcasting
of information to the public, Section 2, however, may be the lightning
rod which triggers the very litigation which would not otherwise have
developed.
Section 3 of the 1973 amendments to SEPA contains the following
provision:
In any action involving an attack on a determination by a govern-
ment agency relative to the requirement or the absence of the require-
ment, or the adequacy of a "detailed statement", the decision of the
government agency shall be accorded substantial weight.
Although courts frequently state they will accord "great," "substan-
tial" or "considerable" weight to administrative determinations, such a
phrase has never signified a coherent standard of judicial review. Sec-
tion 3 probably does no more than restate existing law to the effect
that courts will not substitute their judgment for the judgment of an
agency on a disputed factual issue, and that the burden of showing an
agency decision to be unlawful is upon the party attacking that deci-
sion.150
149. To take advantage of Section 2, a publication must be undertaken on the
basis that it is a "major action" regardless of the correctness of that contention. This
approach offers the greatest of gambles on the part of the person taking such action
for, if litigation is initiated based on the need for an impact statement when one was
not prepared, the person causing the notice to be published is in the awkward position
of denying the need for an impact statement at' such litigation after publicly stating
in writing it was a "major action." The developer perhaps could publish notice without
stating whether or not the project was a major action significantly affecting the environ-
ment by simply describing the project and stating that notice was being published
pursuant to Section 2.
150. City of Medina v. Rose, 69 Wn. 2d 447, 418 P.2d 462 (1966).
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In summary, the 1973 amendments to SEPA contain provisions of
questionable value. The determination of the Legislature to study
SEPA further during the remainder of 1973 and the public legislative
hearings subsequently held indicate that the amendatory actions
during 1973 were quite clearly only interim solutions.151
IV. SEPA-ITS SHORTCOMINGS AND
POSSIBILITIES FOR IMPROVEMENT
In the two and one-half years since its enactment, SEPA has not
yet penetrated into the interstices of the decision-making processes of
most state and local agencies. There are many reasons for this lack of
implementation of SEPA's policies and procedures. To many govern-
ment officials, especially during its first year, SEPA contained nothing
more than statements of unenforceable, lofty ideals. To others, with a
more perceptive eye, its revolutionary message threatened long estab-
lished and comfortable mechanisms of decision-making. SEPA's
directive to change governmental life style discomfited even its most
sympathetic governmental supporters.
SEPA has recently begun to penetrate bureaucratic barriers. How-
ever, two severe shortcomings currently impede full implementation
of its provisions. The most critical problem with SEPA is that most
governmental agencies, state and local, lack the budget and man-
power necessary for full compliance, particularly with the impact
statement requirement which SEPA places upon their shoulders.
The only governmental agencies with resources adequate to comply
with SEPA are those charged with major project construction, such
as the Department of Highways and, possibly, two or three of the
richest counties and cities. The poorer governmental units, such as
large, sparsely settled counties, cannot possibly meet fully SEPA's rig-
orous requirements. Even agencies with strong sympathies for SEPA,
such as the Department of Ecology, have considerable difficulty ad-
151. The Committees on Ecology of the Washington Senate and House of
Representatives have been authorized to evaluate SEPA. S.F. Res., Apr. 15, 1973;
Subject Referral by House Rules Committee to House Ecology Committee, Oct. 6, 1973.
Both Senator Nat Washington, Chairman of the Senate Ecology Committee, and
Representative Edward T. Luders, Chairman of its House counterpart, anticipate the
Legislature will enact amendments to SEPA during 1974. Conversations with Senator
Nat Washington and Representative Edward V. Luders, Dec. 4, 1973.
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ministering regulatory programs in a manner consistent with its direc-
tives. 152
Of the various proposals to alleviate this financial problem, three
seem worthy of further consideration. The first involves agency fi-
nancing. The legislature should never approve the capital construction
budget of any state agency until, after close scrutiny of the agency's
budget proposal, the legislature is fully satisfied that the agency has
included sufficient funds to fulfill SEPA's requirements. In addition,
the legislature should consider increasing the appropriations of those
agencies with environmental expertise (e.g., the Departments of Ecol-
ogy, Fisheries, Game, Natural Resources and Social and Health Ser-
vices) to allow these departments to include substantial scientific data
in their comments upon proposals and draft impact statements sub-
mitted by governmental agencies. Such funding would enable develop-
ment of a central reservoir of scientific expertise from which local gov-
erments and concerned parties could draw. Further, the Legislature
should consider authorizing all governmental agencies faced with a
private proposal requiring an impact statement to pass on all or a
portion of the costs of preparing the statement to the proponent of
the activity.
A second major problem with SEPA is that it lacks a "mother hen.' u5 3
Unlike NEPA, SEPA did not authorize any person or agency to
oversee or interpret its provisions. Some unit of state government must
be given authority to develop enforceable rules of interpretation and
implementation applicable to all branches of state and local govern-
ment. These rules could include: criteria for determining "major ac-
tions significantly affecting the quality of the environment;" elements
for inclusion in detailed statements; a listing of categories of actions
exempted from the detailed statement requirements; and procedures
152. Conversations with John A. Biggs, Director, Department of Ecology, July
& Aug., 1973. Mr. Biggs is perhaps SEPA's strongest supporter among administrators
of state agencies. He is first to state that his unit is often not able to comply with
SEPA in the manner he would like, due primarily to budget, manpower and time
limitations.
153. Section 3 of H.B. 616, reported out of the House Committee on Ecology in
March, 1973, authorizes the Department of Ecology to make general rules for the
implementation of SEPA. The Senate Ecology Committee is presently conducting
hearings on proposed legislation, which would make the Department of .Ecology
the "mothei hen." Governor Evans supports this approach. Conversation with Gov-
ernor Daniel J. Evans, Jan. 17, 1974.
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for determining the responsibility for preparing a single detailed state-
ment when more than one governmental unit is involved in decision
making.
The value of granting such powers, if wisely implemented, could be
great. A mechanism for interpreting and applying SEPA on a uniform
basis would eliminate much of the uncertainty that now prevails in
both governmental and private sectors. Use of uniform procedures
would tend to reduce wasteful, disorganized procedures now in effect
in many governmental units and would provide procedures where
they do not exist. Finally, the ability of a governmental unit to
enforce SEPA undoubtedly would motivate reluctant agencies to
comply with its provisions.
V. CONCLUSION
The passage of the State Environmental Policy Act of 1971 repre-
sents an effort by the Washington State Legislature to bring an end to
the thoughtless, uncoordinated process of decision making in gov-
ernment-a process which too often has imposed an eye-scratching,
unhealthful environmental blight on areas of our state and has produced
wasteful uses of our state's natural resources. Unfortunately, imple-
mentation of SEPA by units of state and local government in
Washington has barely begun.
The legislature can assist greatly in attainment of the goal of full
implementation of SEPA by providing for a central agency to inter-
pret and enforce SEPA's provisions, and by furnishing to each govern-
mental unit the financial means and other resources necessary to
carry out its mandates. Yet, these legislative actions, even when cou-
pled with judicial pressures, cannot assure that SEPA will indeed
"seep" to the center of the decision-making process.
The real threat is that even with fully funded and informed govern-
mental decision makers overseen by a "mother hen" and the courts,
the policies and directions of SEPA will not be carried out. Rather
than attaining full compliance with SEPA, the possibility exists that
governmental agencies will develop precisely drawn procedures,
painstakingly followed, which will produce hollow, environmentally
meaningless decisions complying with the letter but not the spirit of
the law.
In the final analysis, successful implementation of SEPA rests pri-
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manly with the public officials charged with its implementation. The
legislature can provide tools and money. It cannot, however, provide
the spirit, the motivation or the good-faith intention to follow and
implement the environmental policies which SEPA has prescribed for
Washington.
549
